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JURISDICTION 
No. 89-0497: The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and appellees Frederick G. 
Becker II, Margaret M. Becker (the "Beckers"), J. Lynn Dougan 
and Diana Lady Dougan (the "Dougans") on May 5, 1989. R. 
1414-1416. The judgment was certified as final pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff and 
appellant First Interstate Bank of Utah, N.A. ("First 
Interstate") filed a notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court on May 16, 1989. R. 1426-1428. Jurisdiction was 
invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i). The Utah 
Supreme Court assigned the appeal to the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
No. 89-0607: The district court entered summary 
judgment in favor of defendant and appellee Park Meadows 
Investment Co. ("Park Meadows") on July 6, 1989. R. 
1537-1538. A timely notice of appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court was filed on Monday, August 7, 1989. R. 1539-1543. 
Jurisdiction was invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2-2(3)(i). The Utah Supreme Court assigned the appeal to 
the Utah Court of Appeals. 
No. 98-0597: The district court awarded the Beckers 
and Dougans their claimed costs on July 6, 1989. R. 
1 "R." refers to the record on appeal prepared in accordance with Rule 
11(d)(2)(B), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
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1517-1519. Following a timely appeal to the Utah Supreme 
Court, the appeal was remanded to this Court, This Court 
subsequently consolidated all appeals in this matter. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Whether First Interstate properly accelerated 
payment of a note executed by Park Meadows' predecessor in 
interest and guaranteed by the Beckers and Dougans? 
2. Whether the Beckers and Dougans, as guarantors 
of the note, were entitled to notice of the principal 
obligor's default? 
3. Whether, even assuming some default in First 
Interstate's notice obligations, the Beckers and Dougans are 
properly entitled to an absolute discharge without a showing 
of prejudice? 
4. Whether First Interstate is entitled to partial 
summary judgment establishing the Beckers' and Dougans' 
liability under the note? 
5. Whether Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, permits the recovery of deposition costs unrelated 
to the merits of a motion for summary judgment? 
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (1986) and Rule 54(d)(2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, are reproduced as Addendum A to 
this brief. Rule 24(f), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the case and proceedings below 
First Interstate commenced this action in December 
1986 by filing a complaint in the District Court of the Third 
Judicial District, Summit County, against Park Meadows, the 
Beckers, the Dougans, Victor R. Ayers and Marion P. Ayers (the 
"Ayers"). The complaint, filed by leave of the bankruptcy 
court in the midst of a protracted Chapter 11 proceeding 
3 
involving Park Meadows, sought j u d i c i a l foreclosure of a deed 
of t r u s t executed by Park Meadow's predecessor in i n t e r e s t , as 
wel l as c o l l e c t i o n of the underlying note . That note had been 
guaranteed by the Beckers, the Dougans and the Ayers. R. 
1-28. 
On September 26, 1988, F i r s t I n t e r s t a t e f i l e d a 
motion for p a r t i a l summary judgment seeking to e s t a b l i s h the 
l i a b i l i t y of the Beckers, Dougans and Ayers as guarantors of 
the note . R. 723-798. That motion was denied by the d i s t r i c t 
court on December 8, 1988. R. 1098-1100. On February 3, 
1989, the Beckers and Dougans f i l e d a motion for summary 
judgment seeking discharge of t h e i r ob l iga t ions as guarantors 
on the ground that F i r s t In ter s ta t e had improperly accelerated 
the note . R. 1121-1202. That motion, which was granted, 
provides the bas i s for t h i s appeal. 
B. Factual background 
In December 1978, Park City Racquet Club, Inc. 
("PCRC") obtained an $800,000 loan from Walker Bank, a 
2 The complaint a l so named Firs t Security Bank of Utah, N.A. as a 
defendant. F irs t Security was joined in the s u i t because i t held a 
junior secured in t ere s t in the racquet club property. No claim, 
however, was asserted against F irs t Security. 
3 F irs t In ters ta te was granted r e l i e f from the automatic stay on November 
15, 1986. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d). 
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predecessor of First Interstate. The loan was evidenced by a 
note executed by Frederick G. Becker, II, president of PCRC, 
and Victor R. Ayers, secretary of the corporation. R. 
1261-1264 (a copy of the note is attached as Addendum B to 
this brief). The note was secured by a deed of trust covering 
PCRC's principal asset, a racquet club located in Park City, 
Utah. In addition, the note was personally guaranteed by 
Becker and his wife, Ayers and his wife, and the Dougans (the 
"guarantors"). The guaranty, appended to the end of the note, 
provides in its entirety (R. 1263; Addendum B): 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt 
and sufficiency of which is hereby acknowledged, 
the undersigned jointly and severally guarantee 
payment of this Promissory Note (Secured by Deed 
of Trust) and further guarantee payment of the 
entire indebtedness evidenced thereby and the 
Deed of Trust securing the same. 
On May 19, 1982, PCRC transferred undivided one-third 
interests in the racquet club to Becker, Dougan and Ayers. 
This transfer was explicitly made "[sjubject to a loan in 
favor of Walker Bank & Trust Company . . . the unpaid balance 
of which the Grantee [i.e.. Becker, Dougan and Ayers] hereby 
agrees to assume and pay." R. 1266-1267. In August 1982, 
Becker and Dougan exchanged their interests in the racquet 
club for certain lots in a Park City development owned by Park 
Meadows, a partnership consisting of Enoch Smith, Enoch 
Richard Smith and Ayers. R. 1269, 1271. As part of this 
exchange, Park Meadows and its partners agreed to fully 
indemnify Becker and Dougan from any liability (including 
attorneys' fees) arising from their guaranty of the note. R. 
1182. 
The Beckers and Dougans asserted that, at the time of 
the exchange, Park Meadows assumed the payment obligations 
evidenced by the note. E.g., R. 1319. Indeed, by letter 
dated September 2, 1982, to First Interstate, Dougan told 
First Interstate that Park Meadows had assumed full 
responsibility for the loan. R. 1271. Dougan also testified 
that he instructed First Interstate to send all further 
notices to Park Meadows (R. 1274): 
Q. After the exchange, did you continue to 
receive payment notices on the racquet club 
for a period of time? 
A. No, not to my recollection. I think - - We 
very clearly noticed the bank not only were 
we exchanging our interests but that the 
Smiths and Park Meadows — Smiths and Ayers 
and Park Meadows Development were assuming 
and paying the loan and they would do so 
after a date certain. And my recollection 
is that we didn't receive any further 
notices. 
Q, You directed the bank to sent the notices 
someplace else? 
A. I would - - yes. 
Q. That was a "yes"? 
A. Yes. That was a "yes". 
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The Beckers and Dougans, however, have never produced, nor has 
First Interstate received, a copy of an assumption agreement 
executed by Park Meadows. 
Following its acquisition of the racquet club, Park 
Meadows encountered substantial difficulties meeting its 
obligations under the note. Pursuant to Mr. Dougan's 
directions (R. 1271, 1274), First Interstate sent notices of 
nonpayment to Park Meadows. In addition, in June 198 5, First 
Interstate and Park Meadows entered into a work-out agreement 
to restructure other outstanding loans made to Park Meadows by 
First interstate and First Security. R. 1057-1059 A copy of 
the work-out agreement is attached as Addendum C to this 
brief. Park Meadows, however, failed to comply with the terms 
of the work-out agreement. First Interstate also did not 
receive any payments due under the note after November 1, 
1985. R. 756. 
On January 24, 1986, First Interstate notified Enoch 
Richard Smith, a partner of Park Meadows, that the note was in 
default and that, unless all past due amounts under the note 
were paid by February 7, 1986, First Interstate would "take 
the legal actions available to them under the terms of the 
loan documents." R. 1193. Among the actions available to 
First Interstate was the right, "without notice or demand," to 
declare "the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal 
and interest . . . immediately due and payable" if Park 
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Meadow's default was not cured "within fifteen (15) days 
following . . . written notice" of default. Addendum B. The 
note expressly provided that "written notice shall be 
effective as of the time the same is deposited in the United 
Sataes [sic] Mails addressed to the last known address of the 
undersigned or the time of the actual receipt thereof, if 
earlier." Id. The note further provided that (id.): 
The makers, . . . guarantors, and endorsers 
hereof severally waive . . . notice of 
nonpayment, and expressly agree that this Note, 
or any payment hereunder, may be extended from 
time to time by the holder hereof without in any 
way affecting the liability of such parties. 
On February 10, 1986 — seventeen days after 
notifying Park Meadows of its default — First Interstate 
executed a statutory notice of default accelerating the sums 
payable under the note. The notice of default was recorded on 
February 14, 1986. R. 1195. On February 21, 1986, copies of 
the notice of default were sent by certified mail to, among 
others, PCRC, Frederick G. Becker, II, Margaret M. Becker, J. 
Lynn Dougan, and Diana Lady Dougan. R. 1277-1283. J. Lynn 
Dougan later acknowledged that PCRC received a copy of the 
notice of default at its corporate address shortly after 
February 21, 1986. R. 1198. Following receipt of the notice 
of default, the Beckers and Dougans had a statutory three-
month period in which they could cure the default in the note 
- 7 
by paying all then past-due sums. Utah Code Ann, 
§ 57-1-31(1). That right to cure was not exercised. 
The property was not sold pursuant to the statutory 
notice of default. On March 24, 1986, an involuntary 
bankruptcy proceeding was initiated against Park Meadows. The 
filing of that action automatically stayed the pending sale of 
the property under the deed of trust. 11 U.S.C § 3 62. This 
action, seeking judicial foreclosure, was instituted in 
December 1986 after First Interstate obtained relief from that 
automatic stay. 
On January 26, 1987, the district court appointed a 
receiver to manage the racquet club. R. 47-49. Then, on 
October 16, 1987, and pursuant to stipulation of the parties, 
the district court entered an order permitting the sale of the 
racquet club. The sales price of the club was $425,000. R. 
757. All proceeds from the sale of the club were applied to 
the note. Id. As of September 26, 1988, there remained due 
and owing under the terms of the note the principal sum of 
$719,517.54, together with approximately $100,000 in accrued 
interest* Id« As a result, the liability of the Beckers, 
Dougans and Ayers as guarantors of the note became the focus 
of this litigation. 
C. Arguments and decision below 
On September 26, 1988, First Interstate moved for 
summary judgment on the issue of the liability of the Beckers 
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and Dougans under the note. R. 730-798. In their answer to 
the complaint, the Beckers and Dougans asserted that First 
Interstate had released one of the partners of Park Meadows 
and had otherwise impaired the collateral securing the note. 
R. 114. These actions, they contended, resulted in the 
discharge of their guaranty obligations. Id. First 
Interstate submitted that these defenses were factually 
unsupported because undisputed record evidence demonstrated 
that the bank had not released any of the principals of Park 
Meadows and had applied the entire proceeds of the sale of the 
racquet club to the note. R. 740-746, 749-750. In addition, 
First Interstate argued that the defenses were legally 
inadequate because the Beckers and Dougans were fully 
indemnified sureties. R. 746-749. This motion was denied on 
May 5, 1989. R. 1414-1416. 
The Beckers and Dougans thereafter filed their own 
motion for summary judgment. The motion was founded upon an 
exceedingly narrow ground: that First Interstate had not 
properly accelerated the debt evidenced by the note. 
1124-1173. The acceleration was defective, the Beckers and 
Dougans asserted, because First Interstate had not given 15 
days written notice of its intent to accelerate (R. 
1149-1153), and had failed to give written notice to PCRC — 
the original maker of the note. R. 1135-1149. In addition, 
the Beckers and Dougans contended that, even though the 
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language of their guaranty contains no express notice 
requirement, they were entitled to notice because the note and 
the guaranty should be "read together." R. 1153-1171. 
In response, First Interstate argued that its January 
24, 1986 letter to Park Meadows strictly complied with the 
15-day notice provisions contained in the note. R. 1242-1245. 
Moreover, notification of Park Meadows rather than PCRC was 
appropriate for several reasons: first, the bank had been 
directed to send all further notices to Park Meadows (R. 
1271-1274); second, notification of PCRC was impossible 
because the corporation had been dissolved on December 21, 
1982 (R. 1392-1407); and third, by virtue of the assumption of 
the note, Park Meadows as assignee was entitled to first 
receive the notice of default. The Beckers and Dougans, 
furthermore, were not entitled to notice as guarantors because 
their guaranty did not contain an express notice provision. 
R. 1245-1255. Finally, even if the Beckers and Dougans were 
entitled to notice, defective notice did not properly result 
in their absolute discharge but rather released them only to 
the extent they established prejudice — which they could not 
because of their failure to cure Park Meadows' default during 
the three-month statutory cure period. R. 123 5, 1241; Utah 
Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1). 
The district court granted the Beckers' and Dougans' 
motion for summary judgment by order entered May 5, 1989. 
- 10 -
That order found that "[t]he giving of a proper 15 day notice 
was a condition precedent to the right of plaintiff to 
exercise its option to accelerate" the note. R. 1415. The 
court then found, without specifying a precise shortcoming, 
that "[t]he notice required to be given by plaintiff to 
defendant Park Meadows Development prior to plaintiff 
exercising its option to accelerate was defective." Id. 
Finally, the court found that "[t]he 15 day notice required by 
the loan documents to be given prior to accelerating the 
Racquet Club note was not given by plaintiff to the original 
maker, Park City Racquet Club, to defendants Dougans, Beckers 
and Ayers, who assumed the Racquet Club note and thereby 
became makers, nor to defendants Dougans, Beckers and Ayers in 
their capacity as guarantors." Id. Without further 
discussion, the court entered a judgment of "no cause of 
action" in favor of the Beckers and the Dougans. R. 1416. 
On May 19, 1989, Park Meadows filed a motion for 
summary judgment based on the district court's finding that 
First Interstate's notice to Park Meadows "was defective." R. 
1451. The court granted the motion for summary judgment on 
July 6, 1989. R. 1537-1538. 
While Park Meadows' motion for summary judgment was 
pending, the Beckers and Dougans filed a Memorandum of Costs 
and Disbursements, seeking to recover nearly $2,800 in 
deposition costs. R. 1421-1423. First Interstate objected to 
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the recovery of those costs because the depositions were not 
necessary to the prosecution of the summary judgment motion. 
R. 1453-1460. The district court rejected First Interstate's 
submission, and permitted recovery of all claimed deposition 
costs. 
Unlike the Beckers, Dougans and Park Meadows, the 
Ayers have not moved for summary judgment. Accordingly, the 
claims against the Ayers are still pending before the district 
court. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's judgment rests upon a series of 
interlocking — but fundamentally flawed — propositions 
propounded by the Beckers and Dougans. First, they argued 
that First Interstate erroneously gave 14 — rather than 15 — 
days notice of its intent to accelerate the note. Next, they 
asserted that the notice was insufficient because it was given 
to the primary obligor under the note — Park Meadows — 
rather than the original maker, PCRC. Finally, they submitted 
that their guaranty obligations have been discharged because 
they did not receive 15 days notice of First Interstate's 
intent to accelerate. These arguments are unavailing. 
First Interstate#s written notice of its intent to 
accelerate strictly complied with the notice provisions of the 
note. Pursuant to well-established law, that notice was 
properly given to the primary obligor under the note. And, 
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because the Beckers' and Dougans' guaranty did not contain an 
express notice provision, they were not entitled to notice 
prior to acceleration. Moreover, even if the Beckers and 
Dougans could establish a right to notice as guarantors, any 
failure to receive notice does not result in their absolute 
discharge, but rather releases them only to the extent they 
demonstrate prejudice — a showing conclusively precluded by 
this record. Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1). Indeed, far from 
excusing their voluntarily incurred contractual obligations, 
the record below unequivocally establishes the Beckers' and 
Dougans' liability under the note. The district court, 
therefore, should be reversed and this case remanded with 
directions to enter partial summary judgment in favor of First 
Interstate. 
In addition to the foregoing, the district court 
improperly permitted the Beckers and Dougans to recover costs 
incurred in taking depositions completely unrelated to the 
merits of their motion for summary judgment. Rule 54(d)(2), 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, precludes this result. 
ARGUMENT 
I. FIRST INTERSTATE'S WRITTEN NOTICE OF INTENT TO 
ACCELERATE WAS NOT DEFECTIVE 
The Beckers and Dougans argued, and the district 
court found, that "[t]he notice required to be given by 
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plaintiff to defendant Park Meadows Development prior to 
plaintiff exercising its option to accelerate was defective." 
R. 1415. The sole defect isolated by the Beckers and Dougans 
was that the January 24, 1986 letter to Park Meadows gave "14 
days written notice" while First Interstate "had to give 15 
days notice before exercising its option to accelerate." R. 
1149. This assertion, however, is both hypertechnical and 
controverted by the express terms of the note. 
To begin with, the note does not require — as the 
Beckers and Dougans asserted below (R. 1149) — that First 
Interstate explicitly warn a defaulting party when the 15-day 
cure period will expire. Rather, the note provides that 
notice of default must be given, Then, following such notice, 
First Interstate has the option to declare "the entire 
remaining unpaid balances of both principal and interest . . . 
immediately due and payable" if the default is not cured 
"within fifteen (15) days following such written notice." 
Addendum B. The actual acceleration, moreover, may occur 
"without notice or demand." Id. Thus, all that the plain 
terms of the note require is notice followed by a 15-day cure 
period. The undisputed facts here establish that First 
Interstate accelerated the note 17 days after giving notice to 
Park Meadows. Because the law requires no more than 
"substantial compliance with [a] notice requirement" (Local 
No. 1179 v. Merchants Mutual Bonding Co.. 613 P.2d 944, 947 
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(Kan. 1980)) , the complaint that the bank f a i l e d to provide 15 
day's not ice i s "too meticulous and fr ivo lous to warrant 
ser ious cons iderat ion ." McKeanev v. I l l i n o i s Surety Co.. 155 
N.Y.S. 1041, 1043 (N.Y.S.Ct. 1915) . 4 
In any event, F irs t In ters ta te complied with the 
s t r i c t e s t pos s ib l e construct ion of the appl icable not ice 
prov i s ions . Even assuming — as the Beckers and Dougans claim 
— that the not ice must speci fy when the 15-day cure period 
w i l l expire , the January 24, 1986 l e t t e r to Park Meadows 
properly computed that period. Pursuant to the note, "written 
not ice s h a l l be e f f e c t i v e as of the time the same i s deposited 
in the United Sataes [ s i c ] Mails addressed to the l a s t known 
address of the undersigned or the time of the actual rece ipt 
thereof, i f e a r l i e r . " Addendum B (emphasis added). I t i s 
undisputed that , on January 24, 1986, Park Meadows received 
formal not i ce from F ir s t In ter s ta te that the note was in 
defaul t and that , unless the default were cured by February 7, 
4 Accord. Broward County Carpenters Health and Welfare Trust Fund v, Sevgo 
Construction Co.. 570 F. Supp. 817, 819 (S.D. Fla. 1983) (re ject ing the 
asser t ion that not ice of nonpayment of certa in fringe benef i t s must 
"conform to the l e t t er" of statutory not ice requirements; notice need 
only be "adequately given"); Svkes v. Sperov. 179 P. 488, 489 (Ore. 
1919) ( re jec t ing the argument that a surety was e n t i t l e d to discharge 
because not ice was sent to i t s Portland, Oregon, o f f i ce rather than i t s 
New York City o f f i c e ; "any difference in the mere manner of transmitting 
i t , from the method provided in the contract, . . . [ i s ] merely 
technical and t r i v i a l , and could have caused no injury or prejudice to 
the defendant"); McKegnev v. I l l i n o i s Surety Co.. 155 N.Y.S. 1041, 1043 
(N.Y.S.Ct. 1915) ( re jec t ing argument that hand-delivered, rather than 
mailed, not ice was d e f e c t i v e ) . 
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the bank would "take the legal actions available . . . under 
the terms of the loan documents." R. 1193. It is similarly 
undisputable that, if January 24 is counted as the first 
effective day of notice — as it must be under the express 
terms of the note — then February 7 is the fifteenth day. 
The notice provided Park Meadows, therefore, was simply not 
"defective." 
The contrary assertion of the Beckers and Dougans is 
based upon the submission that "in computing time for the 
performance of a given act. . . , the courts have employed a 
method of including either the first or last day and excluding 
the other." R. 1150, 1151-1153 This, of course, is a general 
rule of construction that is reflected (among other places) in 
, , 5 
the Rules of Civil Procedure. General rules and canons of 
construction, however, do not control when the parties to a 
contract have specifically provided otherwise. E.g.. Utah 
Code Ann. § 70A-1-102(3)("The effect of provisions of this 
[Uniform Commercial Code] may be varied by agreement"). Here, 
the parties expressly provided that, while a 15-day cure 
period was required prior to acceleration, notice of default 
would be effective from either the time of mailing or receipt. 
5 See, e.g.. Rule 6(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure ("the day of the 
act, event, or default from which the designated period of time begins 
to run shall not be included"). But see Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26) 
(1980)(notice required by the Uniform Commercial Code is effective when 
it comes to a person's "attention" or is "duly delivered at the place of 
business"). 
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First Interstate's notice to Park Meadows strictly complied 
with these requirements. 
Based on the foregoing, the summary judgment entered 
in favor of Park Meadows must be reversed. That motion was 
founded solely upon the district court's patently erroneous 
finding that First Interstate failed to give a proper, 15-day 
notice to Park Meadows. R. 1450-1452. Because First 
Interstate in fact complied with the notice requirements 
embodied in the note, the summary judgment entered against 
First Interstate in favor of Park Meadows must be set aside. 
II. THE PURPORTED NOTICE DEFECTS IDENTIFIED BY THE 
BECKERS AND DOUGANS DO NOT ENTITLE THEM TO 
DISCHARGE OF THEIR GUARANTY OBLIGATIONS 
The bulk of Beckers' and Dougans' presentation below 
was devoted to developing, in extenso (see R. 1133-1153, 1160-
1172), two unremarkable (indeed, undisputed) principles of 
law: (1) a creditor must give proper notice of its intent to 
accelerate; and (2) notice of the principal's default must be 
given to guarantors if a guaranty contains an express notice 
provision. Unfortunately for the Beckers and Dougans, 
however, these rules are not applicable here. As shown above, 
First Interstate gave proper notice of its intent to 
6 E.g.. KIXX. Inc. v. Stallion Music Co.. 610 P.2d 1385 (Utah 1980); 
Williamson v. Wanlass. 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976). 
7 E.g.. Waikiki Seaside Inc. v. Comito. 641 P.2d 1363 (Hawaii App. 1983); 
Lee v. Vaughn. 534 S.W.2d 221 (Ark. 1976). 
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accelerate. The guaranty executed by the Beckers and Dougans, 
moreover, does not contain an express notice requirement and 
they therefore were not entitled to notice of Park Meadow's 
default. Restatement of Security § 136 (1941). Accord, 
Corporation of the President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Co., 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 1939); Western States Leasing Co. 
v. Adturn, 500 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Colo. App. 1972). 
Faced with these legal realities, the Beckers and 
Dougans were forced to argue a series of untenable — and 
unsupported — propositions. First, they claimed that the 
note was improperly accelerated because the notice of default 
was sent to Park Meadows rather than PCRC, the original maker 
of the note. R. 1135-1149. Next, they asserted that an 
"express" notice requirement could be "implied" into their 
guaranty. R. 1153-1160. Finally, and underlying the two 
preceding submissions, was the assumption that any defect in 
notice — however slight — resulted in absolute discharge. 
R. 1171-1172. The district court, in granting summary 
judgment, accepted this chain of reasoning. R. 1415. But, 
while ingenious, this concatenation simply will not bear 
weight. Notice of First Interstate's intent to accelerate was 
properly given to Park Meadows, the primary obligor under the 
note. Express notice provisions cannot be created by 
implication. And, equally important, even if the Beckers and 
Dougans established a notice defect, that defect does not 
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entitle them to absolute discharge. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 57-1-31(1). 
A. As The Primary Obligor Under The Note, Park 
Meadows Was The Proper Entity To Receive 
Any Notice Required By The Note 
The Beckers and Dougans asserted that, because First 
Interstate ''gave notice of intent to accelerate to [Park 
Meadows], the holder of the note, but elected not to give such 
notice to PCRC, the maker of the note," First Interstate 
"effectively waived its right to accelerate the note as to the 
maker PCRC and therefore has no claim against them as 
guarantors. R. 1149. They also claimed that, because they 
assumed PCRC's obligations under the note, they were entitled 
to notice as "makers" of the note. R. 1315-1320. But, even 
Q 
beyond obvious technica l d e f e c t s , these arguments — which 
were adopted by the d i s t r i c t court in granting summary 
judgment (R. 1415) — lack merit for at l e a s t four reasons. 
F i r s t , n o t i f i c a t i o n of PCRC was impossible: the corporation 
Park Meadows, of course, was not "the holder of the note." R. 1149. 
"Holder" i s a technical term which refers to the person or e n t i t y 
"ent i t l ed to maintain an act ion at law" on a note. 11 Am Jur 2d § 371 
at 395. F irs t In ters ta te , therefore, i s the "holder" of the note. At 
the time i t received not ice of default , Park Meadows had the l i a b i l i t y 
of a "maker" because i t had assumed the loan. Mr. Becker and Mr. 
Dougans moreover, simply cannot claim r ights due a "maker" of the note. 
While the ir assumption of the note gave them primary l i a b i l i t y under the 
note, af ter the transfer of the note to Park Meadows their s tatus was 
secondary -- they were sure t i e s no longer l i a b l e as pr incipals on the 
note. At the time of Park Meadow's defaul t , therefore, Mr. Becker and 
Mr. Dougans did not occupy the pos i t i on of a "maker." 
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was dissolved. Second, the Beckers and Dougans had themselves 
directed First Interstate to deal with Park Meadows. Third, 
the posited notification requirement ignores commercial 
reality. Fourth, as the assignee and primary obligor under 
the note, Park Meadows was the proper entity to receive notice 
of default. 
Just prior to argument of their summary judgment 
motion, the Beckers and Dougans produced documents 
demonstrating that PCRC was dissolved on December 21, 1982. 
These documents, which included articles of dissolution and a 
certificate from the Utah Department of Business Regulation 
certifying the dissolution, were presented to the district 
court. R. 1392-1407. Therefore, even if notice to the 
original maker of a note were ordinarily a precondition to a 
creditor's right of acceleration (which it is not), the 
failure to notify PCRC here would have to be excused because 
PCRC was no longer in existence. "Under these circumstances, 
the giving of notice . . . would have been an idle gesture — 
a useless thing." Sherman. Clay & Co. v. Turner, 2 P.2d 688, 
691 (Wash. 1931). 
The law does not, in any event, require notice to 
PCRC or to the Beckers and Dougans as "makers" prior to 
acceleration of the note. First Interstate gave notice of 
default to Park Meadows because it was instructed to do so by 
Mr. Douaan. Mr. Dougan informed First Interstate that Park 
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Meadows had assumed the loan, and Dougan directed First 
Interstate to send further notices regarding the loan to Park 
Meadows. R. 1271, 1274. Although the Beckers and Dougans 
knew that the note provided for notice, they intentionally 
directed First Interstate to deal with and send notices to 
Park Meadows. Therefore, if any of the parties have 
"effectively waived [their] right[s]" in this case (R. 1149), 
the Beckers and Dougans have waived any claimed right to 
receive notice and they should be estopped from raising any 
objection to the notice of default given by First Interstate. 
See American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21 Utah 2d 
289, 445 P.2d 1 (1968)(waiver is an intentional relinquishment 
of a known right). The Beckers and Dougans certainly should 
not be permitted to seize upon First Interstate's compliance 
with their own directions to escape liability. 
In addition to the above, the submission that the 
original maker and all subsequent assignees of a note must be 
notified prior to acceleration defies common sense and 
commercial reality. Commercial notes, such as the one 
involved in this case, are frequently assigned by both the 
holders and makers of the instruments. To require the current 
holder of a note, prior to enforcing its rights against the 
current primary obligor, to notify the original maker as well 
as all mesne assignees would impose an impractical — and 
often futile — obligation. For one thing, the holder of a 
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note may not have accurate records — nor any means of 
obtaining accurate records — of intermediate transfers. In 
this case, for example, although the Beckers and Dougans 
assert that Park Meadows assumed the loan (R. 1180), First 
Interstate has never received any documentation to support the 
claimed assumption. Moreover, providing notice to the 
original maker and subsequent assignees will often be futile. 
As in this case, the original maker (and subsequent assignees) 
may no longer exist. Therefore, the notice requirement 
posited by the Beckers and Dougans, and adopted by the 
district court, needlessly encumbers the utility of commercial 
paper. 
Finally, notification of the original maker and all 
intermediate assignees is not required under well-established 
principles of contract law. The Beckers and Dougans assert 
that they assumed the note from PCRC, and that Park Meadows 
subsequently assumed the note from them. Accordingly, First 
Interstate was free to deal with Park Meadows as the primary 
obligor under the note. The Second Restatement of Contracts 
§ 328 states the general principles of law governing the 
assignment of contracts as follows: 
(1) Unless the language or the circumstances 
indicate the contrary, . . . an assignment of 
"the contract" or of "all my rights under the 
contract" or an assignment in similar general 
terms is an assignment of the assignor's rights 
and a delegation of his unperformed duties under 
the contract. 
- 22 -
(2) Unless the language or the circumstances 
indicate the contrary, the acceptance by an 
assignee of such an assignment operates as a 
promise to the assignor to perform the 
assignor's unperformed duties, and the obligor 
of the assigned rights is an intended 
beneficiary of the promise. 
Under the principles set forth in § 328 above, the 
respective assumption agreements involving the note operated 
as "an assignment of the assignors'] [e.g. , PCRC's, the 
Beckers' and the Dougans'] rights and a delegation of [their] 
unperformed duties under the contract." To the extent that 
PCRC and the Beckers and Dougans had a right to notice as 
makers of the note, they assigned this right to Park Meadows 
at the time Park Meadows assumed the note. First Investment 
Company v. Andersen, 621 P.2d 683, 686 (Utah 1980) ("Since the 
notes were not negotiable, the transfer by the Nursery to 
plaintiff must be deemed an assignment, and the assignee 
(plaintiff) stood in the shoes of the assignor"). Moreover, 
as an intended beneficiary of the assumption agreements, First 
Interstate had the power to enforce the terms of the note 
directly against Park Meadows. Second Restatement of 
Contracts § 304 (1979)("A promise in a contract creates a duty 
in the promisor to any intended beneficiary to perform the 
promise, and the intended beneficiary may enforce the duty"). 
Accord, Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v, Dickamore, 652 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (Utah 1982). It is undisputed that Park Meadows 
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did receive the notice called for in the note and, 
consequently, the note was properly accelerated. 
B. The Beckers And Dougans Were Not Entitled 
To Notice As Guarantors Of The Note 
In addition to arguing improper acceleration, the 
Beckers and Dougans asserted that their guaranty obligations 
were discharged because First Interstate failed to provide 
them with adequate notice of Park Meadow's default. R. 
1160-1171. This submission is unavailing. The Beckers' and 
Dougans' guaranty was absolute and unconditional. As such, 
First Interstate was not obligated to provide them with notice 
of Park Meadows' default. Restatement of Security § 136 
(1941). The defendants' attempt to import a notice provision 
into the guaranty (R. 1153-1160), moreover, is unpersuasive. 
Indeed, numerous courts — including the Utah Supreme Court — 
have repeatedly rejected the precise argument proffered by the 
Beckers and Dougans. E.g., Corporation of the President v. 
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 
1939) ; Western States Leasing Co. v. Adturn, Inc.. 500 P. 2d 
1190, 1191 (Colo. App. 1972). 
1. Absent an express contractual notice 
requirement, guarantors are not 
entitled to notice of the principal 
obligor's default 
''All courts agree that if the contract of guaranty 
affirmatively calls for notice, it is a condition which must 
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be met in order to bind the guarantor on his promise." 
Electric Storage Battery Co. v. Black, 134 N.W.2d 481, 483 
(Wis. 1965). If the guaranty does not contain an express 
notice requirement, however, the rule is exactly the contrary. 
Unless notice is "required by the terms of the surety's 
contract," a guarantor's "obligation to the creditor is not 
affected by the creditor's failure to notify him of the 
principal's default." Restatement of Security, § 136. 
Accord, Corporation of the President v. Hartford Accident & 
Indemnity Co.. 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 1939)(sureties are "not 
entitled to any notice of default unless the agreement 
specifically provides therefore")(emphasis added); Waikiki 
Seaside Inc. v. Comito. 641 P.2d 1363, 1364-1365 (Hawaii App. 
1982)(a guarantor is entitled to notice only where required by 
the terms of the guaranty). The rationale for this rule is 
set forth in Comment (a) to § 136 of the Restatement of 
Security: 
The rule stated in this Section is an 
application of the usual rule of contracts that 
an obligor is not discharged because he is not 
notified that the time for his performance is 
due, unless he has stipulated for notification. 
The surety, when he undertakes his obligation, 
must realize that there is a risk that the 
principal will not perform. If the surety 
wishes notification, he can insert a requirement 
for it in his contract. 
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This ru l e , and i t s supporting r a t i ona l e , has been cons is ten t ly 
a r t i c u l a t e d and applied by courts throughout the country. 9 
The guaranty executed by the Beckers and Dougans does 
not e x p l i c i t l y c a l l for not ice to the guarantors of the 
p r inc ipa l o b l i g o r ' s defaul t . The guaranty, by i t s terms, does 
not provide any condition precedent to the obl igat ion of the 
9 Lee v. Vaughn. 534 S.W.2d 221, 223-224 (Ark. 1976)(quoting Restatement 
of Security § 136)("'the surety 's ob l igat ion to the creditor i s not 
af fected by the cred i tor ' s fa i lure to not i fy him of the pr inc ipa l ' s 
default unless such n o t i f i c a t i o n i s required by the terms of the 
surety ' s contract'")(emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) ; Bowyer v. Clark Equipment 
Co.. 357 N.E.2d 290, 293 (Ind. App. 1976)("a guarantor i s not e n t i t l e d 
to not ice of h i s p r i n c i p a l ' s default when h i s undertaking to answer for 
h i s p r i n c i p a l ' s debts and obl igat ions i s absolute1 '); Dewey v. Henry's 
Drive-Ins of Minnesota. I n c . . 222 N.W.2d 553, 556 (Minn. 1974)(quoting 
Midway National Bank v. Gustafson. 165 N.W.2d 218, 223 (Minn. 
1968))("Our dec is ions do not support a holding that apart from contract 
a [credi tor] has a duty to inform a guarantor of the [pr inc ipa l ' s ] 
defaul t . . . . '[T]he creditor i s not obliged to look af ter the 
i n t e r e s t s of the surety; ordinari ly , i t i s up to the surety to see to i t 
that the principal performs h i s duty'"); Orkin Exterminating Company 
Inc. v. Stevens. 203 S.E.2d 587, 593 (Ga. App. 1973) ( fa i lure to give 
not ice i s a defense only where contract expressly requires n o t i c e ) ; 
Walker v. Miss i ss ippi Menhaden Products, Inc . . 136 So.2d 607, 609 (Miss. 
1962)(an absolute guaranty "required no not ice of default or demand"); 
American Tobacco Company v. Chalfen. 108 N.W.2d 702, 704-705 (Minn. 
1961)(absolute guaranty requires no not ice of de fau l t ) ; Bloom v. Bender. 
313 P.2d 568, 572 (Cal. 1957)(a guarantor's "contention that not ice to 
her of [the p r i n c i p a l ' s ] default in payment was a condit ion precedent to 
l i a b i l i t y i s without merit. Neither the law nor the subject agreement 
requires such not i ce") ; Beach v. Beach. 107 A.2d 629, 633 (Conn. 
1954)("The guarantee was unconditional and absolute , and no not ice of 
default or demand was necessary"); In re Bi tker 's Estate . 30 N.W.2d 449, 
452 (Wis. 1947)("No not ice of default in the performance of a contract 
by the pr inc ipal party thereto i s necessary in order to hold the 
guarantor to the contract"); Rav v. Spencer. 208 S.W.2d 103, 104 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1947)("The contract here being an unconditional or absolute 
guarantee, no not ice of the default was required to fasten l i a b i l i t y on 
t h i s guarantor"); Yama v. Sigman. 165 P.2d 191, 193 (Colo. 1945)(notice 
of the p r i n c i p a l ' s default must be given to the guarantor where required 
"by the express terms of the guaranty"); Robev v. Walton Lumber Co.. 135 
P.2d 95, 102 (Wash. 1943)("In order to bind the guarantor under an 
absolute guaranty i t i s not necessary that there should be . . . not ice 
of the default of the principal")(quoting 28 C.J. 895-896); Perry v. 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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Beckers and Dougans other than default of the pr inc ipal 
obl igor . The guaranty simply s t a t e s tha t the guarantors 
" jo in t ly and several ly guarantee payment of t h i s Promissory 
Note (Secured By Deed of Trust) and further guarantee payment 
of the en t i r e indebtedness evidenced thereby and the Deed of 
Trust securing the s a m e / Addendum B. The guaranty, 
therefore , i s unconditional and absolute . Valley Bank & Trust 
v. Rite Way Concrete Forming, I nc . , 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 
App. 1987), c e r t , denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988)("A 
guaranty of the payment of an obl igat ion, without words of 
l imi ta t ion or condit ion, i s construed as an absolute or 
unconditional guaranty") . If the Beckers and Dougans 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Cohen. 11 A.2d 804, 805 (Conn. 1940)(quoting City Savings Bank v. 
Hopson. 5 A. 601, 602 (Conn. 1886))("'Upon non-payment at maturity i t 
became, and has s ince continued to be, the ir [the guarantors'] duty to 
go to the holder and pay i t , and th i s without demand or n o t i c e . ' . . . 
In such a case there i s no burden upon the holder of the note to do 
anything as regards the guarantor, but the burden i s on the l a t t e r to 
ascerta in the fact of nonpayment and take the necessary steps to protect 
h i s other i n t e r e s t " ) . 
10 Accord. Robev v. Walton Lumber Co.. 135 P.2d 95, 102 (Wash. 
1943)(quoting Sherman. Clav & Co. v. Turner. 2 P.2d 688, 690 (Wash. 
1931)(emphasis and e l l i p s i s in original) ("'An absolute guaranty i s one 
by which the guarantor unconditionally promises payment or performance 
of the principal contract on default of the principal debtor or obligor, 
the most usual form of an absolute guaranty being that of payment. * * * 
A guaranty i s deemed to be absolute unless i t s terms import some 
condit ion precedent to the l i a b i l i t y of the guarantor'"); Sherman. Clav 
& Co. v. Turner. 2 P.2d 688, 689 (Wash. 1931)(a guaranty cons i s t ing 
simply of the words "Payment Guaranteed" cons t i tu tes an absolute, 
unconditional guaranty); Walker v. Miss iss ippi Menhaden Products. Inc . . 
136 So.2d 607, 608 (Miss. 1962)(contractual language that the 
"Guarantor, w i l l and does hereby guarantee the f u l l performance and 
fu l f i l lment by the Boat Owner of a l l dut ie s , ob l iga t ions , and 
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s imposed upon the Boat Owner by th i s agreement" i s "an 
absolute guaranty"). 
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desired notification, they should have inserted such a 
stipulation into the guaranty before they executed it. 
Corporation of the President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity 
Co,, 95 P.2d 736, 745 (Utah 1939). However, because their 
unconditional guarantee does not call for notice of the 
principal's default, the Beckers' and Dougans' obligations to 
First Interstate are not affected by any "failure to notify 
[them] of the principal's default." Restatement of Security, 
§136. 
2. Guarantors cannot create an express 
right to notice by inference 
In an attempt to avoid the plain import of the 
foregoing authority, the Beckers and Dougans argued below that 
an express notice provision could be imported into the 
guaranty by reading it "together" with the terms of the note. 
R. 1153-1160. The district court apparently adopted this 
reasoning. R. 1415. An "express" right to notice, however, 
cannot be "implied" into the terms of a guaranty. Indeed, the 
Beckers' and Dougans' submission is controverted by the very 
rule of contract construction they invoke and has been 
rejected by numerous courts — including the Utah Supreme 
Court• 
First Interstate does not dispute that, as a general 
rule, "[w]here two or more instruments are executed by the 
same parties contemporaneously, or at different times in the 
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course of the same transaction, and concern the same subject 
matter, they will be read and construed together." Big 
Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake City. 740 P.2d 1357, 
1359 (Utah App. 1987), cert, denied. 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 
1988)(emphasis added)(quoting Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz, 
501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 1972)J.11 But, however well-
established the foregoing rule, it simply does not apply to 
the construction of the guaranty at issue here. 
To begin with, the note and guaranty were not 
executed by the same parties. Only PCRC, through its 
president, signed the note, while the Beckers, Dougans and 
Ayers individually signed the guaranty. Nor does the guaranty 
deal with the same subject matter as the note. As a matter of 
law, a guarantor — whose liability arises only in the event 
of the principal's default — assumes obligations wholly 
independent of the maker of a note. Amick v. Baucrh, 402 P.2d 
342 (Wash. 1965). Courts, therefore, are obliged to consider 
a contract of guaranty and an underlying note as separate 
obligations. Component Systems v. Eight Judicial District 
Court, 692 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Nev. 1985). As the Washington 
Supreme Court succinctly put it: 
The debtor is not a party to the guaranty, and 
the guarantor is not a party to the principal 
obligation. The undertaking of the former is 
11 See also First Security Bank of Utah v. Maxwell. 659 P.2d 1078, 1080 
(Utah 1983); Bullfrog Marina. Inc. v. Lentz. 501 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah 
1972); Verhoef v. Aston. 740 P.2d 1342, 1344 (Utah App. 1987). 
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independent of the promise of the l a t t e r ; and 
the r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s which are imposed by the 
contract of guaranty d i f f e r from those which are 
created by the contract to which the guaranty i s 
c o l l a t e r a l . The fact that both contracts are 
wri t ten on the same paper or instrument does not 
a f f e c t the independence or separateness of the 
one from the other. 
Robey v. Walton Lumber Co., 135 P.2d 95, 102 (Wash. 
1943)(quoting 24 Am Jur. 875, 876 § 4 ) . 
Because a contract of guaranty i s separate and 
independent of the underlying o b l i g a t i o n , courts have 
repeatedly refused to accept the i d e n t i c a l argument propounded 
by the Beckers and Dougans. In Western S ta tes Leasing Co. v. 
Adturn. I n c . , 500 P.2d 1190, 1191 (Colo. App. 1972), the 
guarantor of a defaulted l ease agreement claimed that the 
l e s s o r ' s f a i l u r e to not i fy him of the l e s s e e ' s de faul t 
re leased him from h i s guaranty. The guaranty at i s s u e , l i k e 
1 2 the one in t h i s case , was absolute in terms. " The l e a s e , 
however, ( l i k e the note here) provided for defaul t no t i ce to 
the l e s s e e . Based on reasoning i d e n t i c a l t o that proposed by 
the Beckers and Dougans, the t r i a l court re leased the 
12 The guaranty provided: 
"[Turner] does guaranty to said Lessor, i t s successors and 
ass igns that any and a l l rent or rents which sha l l become due 
under the provis ions of the above described lease s h a l l be 
paid in f u l l when due, and the undersigned does hereby 
acknowledge to be personally obl igated to pay sa id rents 
together with i n t e r e s t thereon as spec i f i ed under the lease at 
the due date thereof." 
guarantor from his obligation. The Colorado Court of Appeals 
reversed. 
The reasoning of the court of appeals is directly 
applicable to this case (500 P.2d at 1191): 
[T]here is no basis for implying that timely 
notice of default should have been given to [the 
guarantor] before liability could be imposed 
under the guaranty. Where a contract of 
guaranty provides that notice of default of the 
principal debtor must be given to the guarantor, 
such notice must be given for the guarantor to 
be liable. Yama v. Sigman. 114 Colo. 323, 165 
P.2d 191. However, where an unambiguous, 
absolute guaranty is silent as to notice and the 
maximum amount guaranteed is determinable at the 
time the guarantee [sic] is entered into, as in 
the case at hand, there is no basis to imply a 
requirement of notice. 
Thus, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court 
erred by "resort[ing] to the language of the lease to construe 
the guaranty as to any limiting conditions." 500 P.2d at 
1191. 
Other courts, on analogous facts, have reached the 
same conclusion as the court in Western States Leasing. Robey 
v. Walton Lumber Co.. 135 P.2d 95, 102-103 (Wash. 1943)(a 
guarantor is not entitled to incorporate into his guaranty the 
contractual provisions of an underlying deed of trust — even 
though those provisions excuse performance by the primary 
obligor; "We are satisfied, as stated, that at the time this 
action was brought, the principal obligor was in default in 
the payment of principal and interest due on the bonds, and it 
- 31 -
appearing that Clyde Walton had unconditionally guaranteed the 
payment of the principal and interest on the bonds when due, 
these respondents are not prohibited from bringing this action 
on the guaranty, regardless of their inability to proceed 
against the principal obligor"); Mortgage & Contract Co, v. 
Linenberg. 244 N.W. 428, 430-432 (Mich. 1932)(guarantor of a 
land purchase contract is obligated to perform under her 
guaranty even though she did not receive notice that the debt 
had been accelerated against the primary obligor; "Mrs. 
Obenauer's guaranty that the vendee would 'faithfully perform 
said contract' included payment under this acceleration clause 
just as much as it included payment of the monthly 
installments" and *[i]f Mrs. Obenauer desired notice of the 
vendee's default as a condition precedent to her being held 
liable under the acceleration clause or as a condition 
precedent to suit on her guaranty, it should have been so 
provided in the contract of guaranty itself"). 
The result reached by the above courts is mandated 
here. The guaranty executed by the Beckers and Dougans is 
absolute and unambiguous. This Court, therefore, may not use 
a notice provision in favor of the maker of the note to imply 
a notice provision in favor of the guarantors. Any doubts 
regarding the propriety of this result are dispelled by the 
decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Corporation of the 
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President v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 95 P.2d 736, 
745 (Utah 1939). 
In Corporation of the President, the Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints sued a surety on a contractor's 
bond based upon the contractor's failure to perform. As in 
this case, the church's contract with the primary obligor 
required express notice of default to the primary obligor. 
The surety bond, in turn, was silent on that issue. As in 
this case, therefore, the surety argued that the notice 
provision in favor of the primary obligor required notice to 
the surety of the primary obligor's default. The Utah Supreme 
Court rejected that assertion with language that requires 
reversal of the district court (95 P.2d at 745): 
The contract and bond do not provide for any 
notice to the Surety. It is arguable that, in 
view of such failure, there should be an 
implication that notice to the [primary obligor] 
was for the benefit of the Surety. But sureties 
in building contracts are not entitled to any 
notice of default unless the agreement 
specifically provides therefore. 
Guarantors are not entitled to notice of a 
principal's default absent express stipulation to the 
contrary. Restatement of Security § 136; n. 9, supra. There 
is no such stipulation here. Courts may not create express 
notice provisions by incorporating the terms of the underlying 
obligation into the guaranty. Corporation of the President, 
supra; Western States Leasing, supra; Robey v. Walton Lumber 
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Co,, supra; Mortgage & Contract Co. v. Linenberg. supra. The 
Beckers and Dougans, therefore, were not entitled to advance 
notice of Park Meadow's default prior to acceleration. 
Finally, even if this Court were to refer to the note 
in construing the guaranty, the note offers little comfort to 
the Beckers and Dougans. The 15-day cure period invoked by 
the defendants applies to the maker of the note. The only 
express note provision that applies to "guarantors" provides 
that the "guarantors . • . severally waive . . . notice of 
nonpayment." Addendum B. As a result, reading the guaranty 
"together" with the note is, in fact, fatal to the defendants' 
position. Waikiki Seaside Inc. v. Comito. 641 P.2d 1363, 1365 
(Hawaii App. 1982)("In this case, the guaranty was absolute in 
form and bound defendants without notice of their acceptance. 
Notice of default is clearly waived; hence, there was no 
requirement to give such notice"). Accordingly, the district 
court's discharge of the Beckers' and Dougans' guaranty 
obligations must be reversed. 
C. Even If The Beckers And Dougans Were 
Entitled To Notice, Their Claimed Right To 
Discharge Lacks Merit 
Even if there existed a viable legal theory under 
which the Beckers and Dougans as guarantors were entitled to 
notice of their principal's default, failure to receive such 
notice does not entitle them to absolute discharge. The 
Beckers' and Dougans' contrary submission, adopted without 
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discuss ion by the d i s t r i c t court (R, 1415-1416), ignores the 
fundamental pr inc ip le that impairment of a sure ty ' s r ights 
does not "have the e f f e c t of discharging the surety 
a l together , but, rather, discharges him pro tanto , that i s , to 
the extent to which he has been injured," 72 C^J.S. Principal 
and Surety, § 159 at 298. The record here unequivocally 
e s t a b l i s h e s that the Beckers and Dougans could not have been 
injured by the claimed lack of no t i ce . 
I t i s wel l e s tabl i shed that f a i lure to g ive required 
not ice to a surety r e s u l t s in discharge only to the extent the 
surety i s prejudiced by the omission. Sect ion 137 of the 
Restatement of Security provides that , i f a surety i s e n t i t l e d 
to n o t i c e , "and i f such not ice i s not g iven, the surety i s 
discharged to the extent of re su l t ing prejudice ." This rule 
13 i s uniformly re f l e c t ed in the decided case s . Application of 
t h i s rule to the Beckers and Dougans requires reversal of the 
d i s t r i c t court because, even assuming they were e n t i t l e d to 
13 Zion ' s F i r s t Nat ional Bank v. Hurs t . 570 P.2d 1031, 1033-1034 (Utah 
1977 ) ( f a i l u r e to give adequate n o t i c e r e l e a s e s a debtor to the ex ten t of 
"any los s caused by the f a i l u r e to so n o t i f y " ) ; Corporat ion of the 
P res iden t v . Hart ford Accident & Indemnity Co.. 95 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah 
1939) ( f a i l u r e to comply with terms of a guaranty does not r e l e a s e the 
guaranty a b s o l u t e l y "but only to the ex ten t to which i t has been 
p re jud iced or has suf fered damage by the non-compliance"); E l e c t r i c 
Storage Ba t te ry Co. v . Black. 134 N.W.2d 481, 487 (Wis. 1965)(sure ty 
d ischarged only to ex ten t t h a t delay in n o t i f i c a t i o n r e s u l t s in 
p r e j u d i c e ) ; P iaseck i v. F i d e l i t y Corp. of Michigan. 63 N.W.2d 671, 676 
(Mich. 1954)(quoting Palmer v. Schrage. 242 N.W. 751 (Mich. 1932) ) ( i f a 
guarantor i s e n t i t l e d to n o t i c e and " i f such n o t i c e was not given, and 
defendants in consequence thereof were damaged, they would be released 
pro t an to from the ir guaranty"). 
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notice of Park Meadow's default, failure to receive that 
notice did not result in cognizable injury. 
The Beckers and Dougans could have been injured by 
lack of notice only if they would have cured Park Meadow's 
default within the 15-day cure period provided by the note. 
To meet this burden of proof, Dougan asserts that he and 
"Frederick G. Becker III were willing and able to cure the 
default on the Racquet Club Note in the first months of 1986, 
and would have done so if they had received timely notice of 
the default." R. 1198-1199. What this submission ignores, 
however, is the fact that — even if First Interstate somehow 
wrongfully deprived them of the 15-day cure period established 
by the note — the Beckers and Dougans nevertheless failed to 
take advantage of a subsequent three-month statutory cure 
period. 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31(1) provides that, where a 
debt secured by a deed of trust has been accelerated, "the 
trustor or his successor in interest . . . or any other person 
having a subordinate lien or encumbrance of record thereon 
. . . at any time within three months of the filing for record 
of notice of default under such trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the beneficiary . . . the 
entire amount then due under the terms of such trust deed . . 
. other than such portion of the principal as would not then 
be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure the default. 
. . ." Invocation of the three-month cure period established 
by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 "suspends the right to sell under 
the power of sale and has the effect of suspending application 
of the acceleration clause if it was triggered by the 
default." I Summary of Utah Real Property Law 399-400 (J. 
Reuben Clark Law School 1978). 
On February 10; 1986, First Interstate executed a 
statutory notice of default accelerating the sum payable under 
the note. This notice was recorded on February 14, 1986. 
Accordingly, as guarantors of Park Meadow's obligations under 
the deed of trust, the Beckers and Dougans had three months 
from February 14, 1986 to cure Park Meadow's default by paying 
the unaccelerated sums past due under the note. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 57-1-31(2)(cancellation of a notice of default can be 
requested by "any person having an interest in the trust 
property"). They did not do so and, as a result, any claim of 
prejudice here is baseless. 
The Beckers and Dougans admit that they received a 
copy of the statutory notice of default shortly after February 
21, 1986. R. 1132-1133. They have also asserted that they 
"were willing and able to cure the default on the Racquet Club 
Note in the first months of 1986." R. 1198. But, no matter 
how one defines the "first months of 1986" (id.), those months 
would necessarily include all of February 1986. The Dougans 
and Beckers, therefore, were not injured by the alleged lack 
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of notice because, by their own admission, they could have 
cured the default — if they in fact had been of a mind to do 
so — for a three-month period following receipt of the notice 
of default pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31. The Beckers' 
and Dougans' failure to cure Park Meadow's default during this 
statutory cure period establishes beyond peradventure that 
their "loss" of the 15-day contractual cure period did not 
result in any actual prejudice: despite their assertions to 
the contrary (R. 1198-1199), the guarantors obviously lacked 
either the will or the ability to cure Park Meadow's default 
at any time "during the first months of 1986." Id. 
III. BECAUSE THEIR DEFENSES ARE INSUFFICIENT AS A MATTER 
OF LAW, FIRST INTERSTATE IS ENTITLED TO PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT ESTABLISHING THE LIABILITY OF THE 
BECKERS AND DOUGANS 
In addition to the notice arguments addressed above, 
the Beckers and Dougans have asserted that First Interstate 
discharged their guaranty obligations by "unjustifiably 
impairing the collateral securing the note and by releasing" 
one of the partners of Park Meadows, Enoch Smith. R. 114. 
These defenses, however, are devoid of merit. Indeed, because 
these defenses — like the notice submissions — are 
insufficient as a matter of law, First Interstate is entitled 
to partial summary judgment establishing the liability of the 
Beckers and Dougans. 
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The claim that First Interstate released the Beckers 
and Dougans by impairing the collateral securing the note is 
without basis in fact or law. It is undisputed that the 
racquet club property was the only collateral securing the 
note. The entire proceeds from the sale of that property, 
moreover, were applied to the note. R. 756-757. In these 
circumstances, an impairment of collateral defense lacks any 
foundation. 
The defense based upon the purported release of a 
Park Meadows partner is likewise chimerical. This defense is 
based entirely upon paragraph five of the loan work-out 
agreement executed between Park Meadows, First Interstate, and 
First Security. Addendum C. That paragraph provides that 
Enoch Smith, a partner of Park Meadows "will be released from 
whatever personal liability may exist on the FSB [First 
Security] debt, FIUT's [First Interstate's] PMD [Park 
Meadows], Enoch Smith Co. and Smith Park Acres Loans and the 
dyers' loan." Addendum C, 15. The only wording in this 
paragraph that even arguably relates to a release under the 
note is the language referring to "FIUT's PMD . . . loan." 
14 Id. First Interstate contends that this language does not 
14 The Enoch Smith Co., Smith Park Acres and "Ayers" loans clearly do not 
refer to the note. 
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refer to the note . But, even assuming that paragraph f ive 
does re fer to the note, paragraph f ive does not — as a matter 
of law — re l ease the guarantors of the note from l i a b i l i t y . 
To begin with, the re l ease of a partner does not 
r e l e a s e e i t h e r the partnership or the guarantors of the 
partnership 's debt. Under Utah law, partnerships are separate 
e n t i t i e s from the partners . For example, while a partner has 
an equal r ight with h i s partners to possess s p e c i f i c 
partnership property for partnership purposes, a partner has 
no r ight to possess such property for other purposes. Utah 
Code Ann. § 48-1-22(2) (a) (1989). Partnership a s s e t s a l s o 
cannot be used to s a t i s f y an individual partner ' s o b l i g a t i o n s 
without a charging order. Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-25 (1989). 
S imi lar ly , although partners are l i a b l e for partnership debts , 
the a s s e t s of the partnership must f i r s t be exhausted before 
c r e d i t o r s can reach the individual a s s e t s of the partner. 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-37 (1989). Consequently, the r e l e a s e of 
a partner does not re l ease the partnership and — without 
r e l e a s e of the partnership — any claimed b a s i s for re l ease of 
the partnership 's guarantors disappears. 
15 At the time the work-out agreement was executed, Park Meadows owed Firs t 
In ters ta te on two secured and three unsecured loans re lated to the 
development of the Park Meadows golf course. These loans were the "PMD 
. . . loans" referred to in paragraph f i v e . Indeed, these loans -- but 
not the note -- were subsequently re leased by separate documents 
implementing the terms of the work-out agreement. R. 787-795. 
But, even i f re lease of a partner could somehow be 
construed as a re l ease of the partnership, any defense based 
on the work-out agreement i s s t i l l l e g a l l y d e f i c i e n t because 
paragraph f ive does not c o n s t i t u t e a present re lease of 
anyone. Paragraph f ive s t a t e s that Enoch Smith "will be 
released" (Addendum C 5 5)(emphasis added); i t does not 
provide that Smith "is hereby released" — wording that would 
be expected i f paragraph f ive e f f ec ted a present r e l e a s e . 
Indeed, paragraph f ive of the agreement i s no more a re lease 
of Enoch Smith than paragraph four i s a blanket mortgage or 
paragraph two a $1 mi l l i on loan. Moreover, the agreement 
express ly provides that i t s terms, including paragraph f i v e , 
w i l l be implemented * [ a ] t the contemplated c l o s i n g . " Addendum 
C % 1. In fac t , one of the partners of Park Meadows who 
negotiated the work-out agreement characterized the agreement 
as "just an o u t l i n e . " Deposition of Enoch Richard Smith, Vol. 
1 at 115. 
As such, the work-out agreement merged with and was 
superseded by the c lo s ing documents that gave e f f e c t to i t s 
prov i s ions . And, while these c lo s ing documents did l i m i t 
16 National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Bros. . Inc . . 29 Utah 2d 460, 511 
P.2d 731, 733 (1973)("where part ies engage in negot iat ions concerning a 
transaction, pursuant to which they enter into a writ ten contract, i t i s 
presumed that a l l matters re la t ing to the subject are merged in and 
cons t i tu te a complete integrat ion of the ir agreement"); Mawhinnev v. 
Jensen. 120 Utah 142, 232 P.2d 769, 774 (1951)(a f ina l contract 
represents "the f ina l meeting of the minds, and in i t are merged a l l the 
terms expressing the f ina l intent ions of the part ies and any 
augmentations. If there are incons i s tenc ies between the terms of the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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First Interstate's recourse against Enoch Smith and Margaret 
Smith on certain specified loans, the racquet club note was 
not included among those enumerated loans, R. 782, 787-788, 
Addendum D at % 1, attached. Thus, because the only release 
that was actually effectuated did not apply to the note 
guaranteed by the Beckers and Dougans, their "release" defense 
fails as a matter of law. 
Finally, even assuming (contrary to the above) that 
release of a partner releases the partnership and that First 
Interstate effected a present release of Park Meadows, the 
Beckers and Dougans would not be discharged from their 
guaranty because they have been fully indemnified by the 
partners of Park Meadows. "In the few cases that have arisen, 
it has been held that a release of the principal does not 
discharge a surety if he is indemnified." L. Simpson, 
Handbook on the Law of Suretyship 304 (1950). Accord, F. 
Childs, Law of Surety and Guaranty 251 (1907)("If the surety 
be fully indemnified, the rule [that a release of the 
principal will discharge the surety] does not apply, as the 
surety in such a case occupies the position of a principal, 
and cannot be injured by the principal's release"). This rule 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
preliminary and final contracts, those of the latter will ordinarily 
govern"); Beck v. Megli. 153 Kan. 721, 114 P.2d 305, 309 (1941)(a 
memorandum agreement to lease and purchase a mill merged into a contract 
that was executed several days later because the contract set out in 
detail the terms of the lease and purchase). 
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— founded upon common-sense recognition of the fact that an 
indemnified surety is not harmed by release of the principal 
because the surety still has recourse against the principal on 
the indemnification (id,) — absolutely precludes the Beckers' 
and Dougans' invocation of any defense based upon a purported 
release of Park Meadows or its partners. 
Dougan and Becker chose to exchange their interest in 
the racquet club with Park Meadows. They did not obtain a 
novation. Consequently, they knew that they remained liable 
on their guaranty of the racquet club note. To protect 
themselves from this liability, they obtained a full indemnity 
from Park Meadows and its individual partners. Dougan and 
Becker knew that, if Park Meadows did not perform, they would 
have to pay the note and attempt to collect from Park Meadows 
and its partners. This is precisely the position they occupy 
today. Park Meadows has not performed on the note. 
Therefore, regardless of any purported "release" of Park 
Meadows, the Dougans and Beckers remain liable on the guaranty 
and must look to Park Meadows and its partners on their 
indemnity. 
17 See R. 1182. The indemnity agreement executed by Park Meadows and its 
partners as individuals on August 31, 1981 provided that Park Meadows 
would "indemnify and hold harmless J. Lynn Dougan and Frederick G. 
Becker II with regard to any and all obligations, damages or claims with 
regard to a certain Promissory Note dated December 11, 1978 in the 
amount of $800,000 secured by Deed of Trust covering property known as 
the Park City Racquet Club." R. 1182. 
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IV. THE DEPOSITION EXPENSES CLAIMED BY THE BECKERS 
AND DOUGANS CANNOT BE RECOVERED AS "COSTS" UNDER 
RULE 54(d)(2), UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
authorizes a prevailing party to recover certain costs 
(including filing fees and stenographic costs) so long as "the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in the action or 
proceeding." After prevailing on their summary judgment 
motion, the district court awarded the Beckers and Dougans the 
costs incurred in taking 12 depositions — even though those 
depositions were not necessary to (or even used in support of) 
their motion. If this Court reverses the lower court's 
judgment, it will not be necessary to address the propriety of 
this award. If this Court affirms, however, the award of 
costs entered below should be reversed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held that 
costs for the taking of depositions will not be awarded unless 
they are "essential for the development and presentation of 
the case" fHiahland Construction Co. v. Union Pacific Railroad 
Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1051 (Utah 1984)), and are actually used 
at trial. Nelson v. Newman. 583 P.2d 601, 604 (Utah 1978). 
In Nelson, the Utah Supreme Court upheld the lower court's 
decision not to award costs for the taking of depositions 
which were not used during the trial and which defendants 
failed to demonstrate were necessary to the preparation of 
their case. Id. 
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Although several of the depositions for which the 
Beckers and Dougans were awarded costs involved issues totally 
18 
unrelated to the or ig ina l issuance of the note, the bulk of 
the depos i t ions were taken of indiv iduals who were involved 
with e i t h e r the negot ia t ion , execution or administration of 
the note . R. 1457-1459. For t h i s reason, the Beckers and 
Dougans can accurately claim that the depos i t ions had some 
general "relevance" to t h e i r case . But general "relevance" i s 
not enough. To recover on the 12 depos i t ions , they must 
e s t a b l i s h that the discovery for which they seek reimbursement 
was necessary or e s s e n t i a l to t h e i r summary judgment motion. 
Rule 5 4 ( d ) ( 2 ) ; Highland Construction Co., supra; Nelson v. 
Newman, supra. That showing cannot be made here. 
The Beckers and Dougans prevai led below on an 
exceedingly narrow c l u s t e r of i s s u e s : whether F ir s t 
I n t e r s t a t e gave proper not ice of i t s intent to acce l era te , 
whether F ir s t I n t e r s t a t e erred in g iv ing that not ice to Park 
Meadows rather than PCRC, and whether F ir s t I n t e r s t a t e erred 
by not g iv ing not i ce of defaul t to the Beckers and Dougans. 
Their motion did not re ly whatsoever on the 12 depos i t ions for 
18 One of the depos i t ions , that of Douglas Matsumori, involved an attorney 
who represented Firs t Security Bank in loan work-out negot iat ions with 
Park Meadows. Mr. Matsumori, as a representative of a party adverse to 
F irs t In ter s ta te , obviously had absolutely no involvement in drafting or 
acce lerat ing the note at i ssue here. At l e a s t two other deposit ions 
(Wayne Grey Petty, Mark D. Howell) a lso dealt primarily with loan work-
out discuss ions unrelated to the execution or acce lerat ion of the note. 
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which they were awarded costs. As the pleadings filed in 
support of their motion demonstrate, the Beckers' and Dougans' 
motion was based solely on the language of the note — a 
document that has been available to them since the 
commencement of this action — and affidavits prepared 
exclusively for the motion. R. 1124-1202; 1302-1351. The 
arguments found dispositive below, therefore, were available 
to the defendants since the commencement of this action. The 
Beckers and Dougans are not entitled to recover costs relating 
to the development of other aspects of the case simply because 
they chose to postpone raising their "notice'1' arguments. 
CONCLUSION 
The Beckers and Dougans executed an absolute and 
unconditional guaranty in favor of a predecessor of First 
Interstate in order to secure financing of a venture 
controlled by them. That venture turned sour, resulting in 
significant losses. The Beckers and Dougans, by means of the 
technical defenses and arguments discussed above, have 
attempted to shift those losses from their own shoulders onto 
the backs of First Interstate and its shareholders. This 
Court should not countenance such a result. None of the 
defenses raised by the Beckers and Dougans — whether based on 
a claimed lack of notice, impairment of collateral, or release 
of Park Meadows — have any legal merit. Accordingly, the 
judgment of the district court should be reversed, and the 
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Court should enter partial summary judgment in favor of First 
Interstate establishing the Beckers' and Dougans' liability as 
guarantors. The Court should then remand this case for 
determination of the final amount due under the note. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN 
' (JisiA4.(Lmitf Cooor/ 
Mar/AnweQ. Wood ^ 
Ricriie \y. Haddock 
Richard G. Wilkins 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant First Interstate 
Bank 
NOVEMBER 22, 1989 
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ADDENDUM A 
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-31 (1986) provides: 
(1) Whenever all or a portion of the principal 
sum of any obligation secured by a trust deed 
has, prior to the maturity date fixed in such 
obligation, become due or been declared due by 
reason of a breach or default in the performance 
of any obligation secured by the trust deed, 
including a default in the payment of interest 
or of any installment of principal, or by reason 
of failure of the trustor to pay, in accordance 
with the terms of the trust deed, taxes, 
assessments, premiums for insurance, or advances 
made by the beneficiary in accordance with terms 
of such obligation or of such trust deed, the 
trustor or his successor in interest in the 
trust property or any part thereof or any other 
person having a subordinate lien or encumbrance 
of record thereon or any beneficiary under a 
subordinate trust deed, at any time within three 
months of the filing for record of notice of 
default under such trust deed, if the power of 
sale is to be exercised, may pay to the 
beneficiary or his successor in interest the 
entire amount then due under the terms of such 
trust deed (including costs and expenses 
actually incurred in enforcing the terms of such 
obligation, or trust deed, and the trustee's and 
attorney's fees actually incurred) other than 
such portion of the principal as would not then 
be due had no default occurred, and thereby cure 
the default theretofore existing and, thereupon, 
all proceedings theretofore had or instituted 
shall be dismissed or discontinued and the 
obligation and trust deed shall be reinstated 
and shall be and remain in force and effect the 
same as if no such acceleration had occurred. 
(2) If the default is cured and the trust deed 
reinstated in the manner provided in Subsection (1), the 
beneficiary, or his assignee, shall, on demand of any 
person having an interest in the trust property, execute 
and deliver to him a request to the trustee to execute 
and deliver to him a request to the trustee to execute, 
acknowledge, and deliver a cancellation of the recorded 
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notice of default under such trust deed; and any 
beneficiary under a trust deed, or his assignee, who, for 
a period of 3 0 days after such demand, refuses to request 
the trustee to execute and deliver such cancellation is 
liable to the person entitled to such request for all 
damages resulting from such refusal• A release and 
reconveyance given by the trustee or beneficiary, or 
both, or the execution of a trustee's deed constitutes a 
cancellation of a notice of default. Otherwise, a 
cancellation of a recorded notice of default under a 
trust deed is, when acknowledged, entitled to be recorded 
and is sufficient if made and executed by the trustee in 
substantially the following form: [form for Cancellation 
of Notice of Default omitted]. 
Rule 54(d)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
provides: 
The party who claims his costs must within five 
days after the entry of judgment serve upon the 
adverse party against whom costs are claimed, a 
copy of a memorandum of the items of his costs 
and necessary disbursements in the action, and 
file with the court a like memorandum thereof 
duly verified stating that to affiant's 
knowledge the items are correct, and that the 
disbursements have been necessarily incurred in 
the action or proceeding. A party dissatisfied 
with the costs claimed may, within seven days 
after service of the memorandum of costs, file a 
motion to have the bill of costs taxed by the 
court in which the judgment was rendered. 
A memorandum of costs served and filed after the verdict, 
or at the time of or subsequent to the service and filing 
of the findings of fact and conclusions of law, but 
before the entry of judgment, shall nevertheless be 
considered as served and filed on the date judgment is 
entered. 
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ADDENDUM B 
PPOMISSORY NOTE 
(SECURED BY DEED OF TRUST) 
FOR VALUE RECEIVED, the undersigned promises and agrees to 
pay to the order of WALKER BANK & TRUST COMPANY (hereinafter termed 
"Walker") or its assigns, at the main office of Walker, Salt Lake 
City, Utah, or at such other place as the holder hereof may 
designate in writing, the principal sum of Eight Hundred Thousand 
Dollars ($800,000.00) in lawful money of the United States of 
America, together with interest on the unpaid balance thereof at 
the rata of eleven percent (11%) per annum until paid. Principal 
and interest shall be paid in equal monthly installments of Seven 
Thousand Eight Hundred Forty-One Dollars ($7,341.00) each com-
mencing with a payment on the 1st day of January, 1979, and 
continuing with a like payment on the first day of each succeeding 
calendar month thereafter until the entire remaining unpaid balance 
of principal and interest has been paid in full; provided, however, 
that the 'final payment hereunder shall be in an amount equal to 
the then remaining unpaid balance. Installments shall be applied 
first toward the payment and satisfaction of accrued and unpaid 
interest and the remainder shall be applied toward the reduction 
of principal. Interest for each monthly payment and period shall 
be computed on a 360-day year basis. Interest, if any, which 
accrues during the period commencing with the date of this Note 
and ending prior to the date of the first installment due here-
under shall be deducted from the proceeds of the loan evidenced 
hereby. 
The undersigned shall have the option to prepay all or any 
portion of the unpaid principal balance of the Mote in any one 
(1) year without penalty. In the event the undersigned shall 
exercise such option, the same shall not relieve the undersigned 
nor waive any obligation of the undersigned to make timely monthly 
installment payments thereafter maturing. Walker or its assigns 
shall, at any time following the expiration of ten (10) years 
from and after the date of execution hereof, at any time during 
the remainder of the term hereof have the sole and exclusive option 
to declare the entire unpaid balance due and payable upon giving 
to the undersigned sixty (60) days notice in writing of its intent 
to declare the same due and payable. 
The undersigned further agrees to pay to Walker or its assigr.i 
at the sole and exclusive option of Walker or its assigns, budget 
payments on a monthly basis in addition to principal and interest 
as hereinabove set forth. Such budget payments shall be in an 
amount equal to one-twelfth (1/12) of the annual real property 
taxes and casualty insurance premiums on the real property and 
improvements described in the Deed of Trust securing this Note 
and with respect thereto, the undersigned further acknowledges and 
agrees that neither Walker nor its assigns is obligated to pay and 
the undersigned specifically waives any claim to the payment of 
interest, earnings or other sums or amounts by Walker or its 
assigns on such budget payments. Neither Walker nor its assigns 
shall pay interest or earnings on any ether sums or amounts 
held for"the benefit of or deposited by the undersigned in 
connection with this Note or the Deed of Trust securing the san.e. 
In the avent of the exercise of said option, walker«or its 
assigns shall give to the undersigned thirty (30} days notice 
in writing of its intent to require payment by the undersigned 
of said budget payments. 
In the event any installment or payment (including an instal 
ment or payment with respect to which the late charge provided fc 
in this Paragraph has previously been imposed) provided to be mad 
hereunder, or under any instrument given to secure the payment of 
the obligation evidenced hereby, has not been paid in full on or 
before the fifteenth (15th) day of any month the same is due as 
provided herein, the holder hereof shall have the right to demand 
of and receive from the undersigned a late charge equal to four 
percent (4%) of the entirety of such installment or payment. 
In the event: (a) any installment provided for hereunder i 
not paid in full within fifteen (15) days*after its scheduled due 
date; or (b) the undersigned defaults in the performance of any 
covenant or promise contained herein or in any instrument given 
to secure the payment of the obligations evidenced hereby; or (c) 
a petition is filed seeking that any of the undersigned or any 
general partner in any of the undersigned be adjudged a bankrupt; 
or (d) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of th 
undersigned makes a general assignment for the benefit of credito 
or (e) any of the undersigned or any general partner in any of th 
undersigned suffers the appointment of a receiver; or (f) any of 
the undersigned or any general partner in any of the undersigned 
becomes insolvent; or (g) any of the undersigned or any general 
partner in any of the undersigned undergoes liquidation, termi-
nation, or dissolution, then, in any of such events and upon 
fifteen (15) days written notice given to the undersigned by 
Walker or its assigns which default or event shall not be cured 
by the undersigned within fifteen (15) days following such writte 
notice, the entire remaining unpaid balance of both principal 
and interest owing hereunder shall, at the option of the holder 
hereof and without notice or demand, become immediately due and 
payable. Thereafter, said unpaid balance, including interest, 
shall, until paid and both before and after judgment, earn intere 
at the rate of fifteen percent (15%) per annum. As used herein, 
written notice shall be effective as of the time the same is de-
posited in the United Sataes Mails addressed to the last known 
address of the undersigned or the time of the actual receipt 
thereof, if earlier. The acceptance of any installment or pay-
ment after the occurrence of a default or event giving rise to 
the right of acceleration provided for in this Paragraph shall 
not constitute a waiver of such right of acceleration with respec 
to such default or event or any subsequent default or event. 
In the event any payment under this Note is not made, or any 
obligation provided to be satisfied or performed under any instru 
ment given to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is not satis 
fied or performed, at the time and in the manner required, the 
undersigned agrees to pay any and all costs and expenses (regard-
less of the particular nature thereof and whether or not incurred 
in conjunction with litigation, before or after judgment, or in 
connection with exercise of power of sale provided for in the 
Deed of Trust securing this Note) which may be incurred by the 
holder hereof in connection with the enforcement of any of its 
rights under this Note or under any such other instrument, ir.clud 
court costs and reasonable Trustee's and Attorney's fees. 
Notwithstanding any other provision contained in this Mote 
or in any instrument given to secure the obligation evidenced her 
(i) the rates of interest, charges and penalties provided for 
herein and therein shall in no event exceed the rates, charges, 
and penalties which result in interest being charged at a rate 
equaling the maximum allowed by law; and (ii) if, for any reason 
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whatsoever, th~ holder hereof ever receive as interest in connec-
tion with the transaction of which this Mote is a part an amount 
which would result in interest being charged at a rate exceeding 
the maximum allowed by law, such amount or portion thereof as 
would otherwise be excessive interest shall automatically be appii 
toward reduction of the unpaid principal balance then outstanding 
hereunder and not toward payment of interest. 
The makers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof 
severally waive presentment for payment, protest, demand, notice 
of protest, notice of dishonor, and notice of nonpayment, and ex-
pressly agree that this Note, or any payment hereunder, mav be 
extended from time to time by the holder hereof without in*any 
way affecting the liability of such parties. This Note shall be 
the joint and several obligation of all makers, sureties, 
guarantors and endorsers and shall be binding upon their respec-
tive heirs, personal representatives, successors and assigns". 
In the event any of the undersigned is a partnership or 
corporation, each person executing this instrument on behalf of 
such entity individually and personally represents and warrants 
that this Note and each instrument signed in the name of such 
entity and delivered to secure the obligation evidenced hereby is 
in all respects binding upon such entity as an act and obligation 
of said partnership or corporation. 
This Note and the Deed of Trust securing the same shall be 
fully and freely assignable in whole or in part by Walker cr its 
assigns as they shall deem advisable without notice to the under-
signed. 
This Note is given in consideration of a loan made by Walker 
to the undersigned for business purposes and not personal", family, 
household, or agricultural purposes and is principally secured by 
a Deed of Trust covering real property situated in Summit County* 
State of Utah. This Note shall be governed by and construed in* 
accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
DATED this day of , 1973. 
PARK CITY RACQUET CLUB, a Utah 
ATTEST: corporation 
' 3y . 
Secretary President 
For good and valuable consideration, the receipt and sufficie: 
of which is hereby acknowledged, the undersigned jointly and 
severally guarantee payment of this Promissory Note (Secured by 
Deed of Trust) and further guarantee payment of the entire indebte: 
ness evidenced thereby and the Deed of Trust securing the same. 
FREDERICK 
MARGARET 
VICTOR R. 
G. 3ECKER 
M. 3ECXER, 
± *. i 
Ind 
AYERS, Indivi 
Individ; 
ividua-1; 
dually 
ial! 
MARION P. AYERS, Individually 
015781 
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DIANA LADY DOUGAN, Individually 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day oj ^ _. - /' ,-,' 1978, personally 
appeared before me, '~ c •- -•- - and .'-.-"•- -
who being by me first duly sworn, did say that -r.ey 
the President and Secretary, respectively, of PARK CITY RACQUET 
CLUB, and the foregoing instrument was signed on behalf of said 
corporation by authority of_a Resolution of its Board of Directs 
or its By-laws, and said . - ~_ and - -
- -•* .. acknowledged to me that said corporation 
executed the same. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the • . day of .,-'-. -^  .. ~ , 1973, personally 
appeared before me FREDERICK G. BECKER, II, MARGARET M. BECKER, 
VICTOR R- AYERS, MARION P. -XYERS, J. LYNN DOUGAN and DIANA LADY 
DOUGAN, the signers above named, who being by me first duly 
sworn acknowledged to me that they executed the within and fore-
going instrument. 
Notary Public 
Residing at: 
My Commission Expires: 
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ADDENDUM C 
PARK MEADOWS DEVELOPMENT AND RELATED ENTITIES: 
WORKOUT ARRANGEMENT WITH FIUT AND FSB 
1. At the contemplated closing, interest in the approximate sum 
of $600,000, will be brought current on all loans of both 
Banks to Park Meadows Development and related entities. The 
source of funds will be $200,000 from the Smiths and loans 
proceeds from FSB, if approved. 
2. Mark Howell will seek FSB approval of a loan to PMD in the 
maximum sum of $1,000,000 to be utilized to pay the balance 
of accrued interest, general claimants ($164,000), and Jack 
Nicklaus ($13,900), and to provide working capital needs in 
the future. Such future draws will be permitted only after 
submission and approval of detailed budgets and/or invoices 
to both banks. PMD will provide notification of actual 
expenditures to both banks. Such loan shall be secured by 
a first priority lien (by reason of subordination) on all 
properties subject to the blanket mortgage mentioned in 
paragraph 4 hereafter (except for First Federal's trust deeds). 
3. PMD will be allowed to pay the $300,000 debt to Enoch Smith 
Sons Company out of lot sale proceeds at the rate of 5 percent 
of such proceeds. This will require total sales of 
$6,000,000. 
4. A blanket mortgage for the benefit of FSB and FIUT will be 
placed on all of Park Meadows properties (exclusive of Park 
Meadows Mountain), and the assets of Enoch and Dick Smith. 
This mortgage will not disturb the first trust deeds of First 
Federal or FSB as to Gleneagles and Lot 1765, but will cover 
any equity in those properties. Said mortgage will exclude 
the following assets of Enoch and Margaret Smith: Their home, 
two cars, Country Club membership/ $250,000 in cash, $184,000 
worth of securities to be identified, two stud horses, life 
insurance, and Enoch Smith Sons Company and its assets. Also 
excluded are the real property where Enoch Smith Sons Company 
is located and all other stock in that company. Enoch Smith 
Sons Company will remain liable to FIUT on the $500,000 loan. 
The blanket mortgage will secure all debt of PMD to FSB and 
FIUT, and also the debts to FIUT of Smith Park Acres Ranch, 
Enoch Smith Company, Weaver Quality Welding, and the "Ayers* 
loan. The "Ayers" loan will cease to be an obligation of 
Enoch Smith Sons Co. 
5. Enoch and Margaret Smith will be released from whatever 
personal liability may exist on the FSB debt, FIUT's PMD, 
Enoch Smith Co. and Smith Park Acres loans and the "Ayers" 
loan. Enoch Smith will retain whatever liability he now has 
991ft 
on the $500,000 Enoch Smith Sons Company loan, Dick Smith 
will not have personal liability on the "Ayers* debt. 
The Enoch Smith Sons Company $500,000 loan will be repayable 
by quarterly interest only payments for one year with a due 
date in one year at a rate of FIUT's prime rate plus %% and 
prime rate plus 2%% after default. It will be renewable on 
the same terms for an additional year if no default exists. 
Smiths to provide Banks with budgets acceptable to banks and 
schedule of price listings for lots, including variables for 
bulk sales, for Banks" approval. If parties can't agree with 
respect to prices, the parties agree to select a mutually 
acceptable third party to set prices, considering current 
market and need to sell within a relatively short period of 
time. 
Sales proceeds to be allocated as follows after payment of 
commissions: Allowed first trust deeds release prices where 
applicable (First Federal and First Security's Gleneagles, and 
lot 1765); some allowance for working capital needs; balance 
to FIUT and FSB for their agreed pro rata distribution. 
Pro rata distribution with FIUT and FSB: Straight pro rata 
based on relative total debt for accrued interest (exclusive 
of "Ayers" debt): Principal reductions to pay off FSB first, 
including the loan under paragraph 2 above, then remainder to 
FIUT. Essentially, FIUT subordinates to FSB. The order of 
payment of FIUT's loans secured by the blanket mortgage will 
be as follows: $100,000 loan to Enoch Smith Co.; $250,000 
loan to Smith Park Acres Ranch; $150,000 loan to Weavers 
Quality Welding; loans to Park Meadows Investments; "Ayers* 
loan. In the event that the Kentucky ranch is sold, the 
proceeds will be applied to the extent necessary to pay the 
Smith Park Acres loan, with any excess to be considered 
proceeds of the blanket mortgage. If assets of Weavers 
Quality Welding are sold, the net proceeds will be applied to 
that company's loan. 
Require retention of professional sales or project manager 
either initially or if performance falters. 
Banks to be informed of any and all offers, firm or tentative, 
to purchase lots, parcels, the whole project, etc. 
Banks will use best efforts to satisfy obligations out of 
collateral other than Park City ranch. 
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Dismissal of FSB's pending foreclosure action and press 
release of same. 
Enoch and Dick Smith will subordinate their right as partners 
of Park Meadows Investment to receive proceeds from Park 
Meadows Mountain to FIUT's "Ayers" loan. 
All of the loans to be secured by the blanket mortgage and the 
new loan which is provided in paragragh 2 above shall be 18 
month term loans, with interest payable on a quarterly basis 
commencing September 1, 1985, interest accruing at the rate of 
%% above the prime rate of the respective banks. Interest on 
HAyersH loan to be deferred to maturity date. Loan 
documentation shall include the agreement and obligation of 
Park Meadows Development and the Borrowers to meet agreed 
upon dollar volumes of property sales from the Park Meadows 
project by agreed upon guideline dates. A failure to meet 
those goals will constitute a default under the terms of the 
loan documentation, provided however, that a reasonable period 
(to be hereafter determined in the reasonable discretion of 
the Banks) will be allowed for cure and reinstatement. Cure 
and reinstatement will be conditioned upon evidence, 
satisfactory to FSB and FIUT that the sales required for 
satisfaction of the goals are immediately forthcoming or that 
they, in fact, have occurred; and, further, upon reasonable 
satisfaction of FSB and FIUT that the reasons for the failure 
to meet the goals are not to continue or result in any 
substantial likelihood of further defaults and failures. FSB 
and FIUT will agree that an additional 18 month term will be 
granted so long as the aforesaid sales goals are being met and 
no other defaults exist under the loan documents. In this 
connection, it is agreed that, net of amounts due to First 
Federal on properties on which it maintains 1st priority 
encumbrances, all sale proceeds shall be applied as set forth 
in the paragraphs above. 
If default occurs and is not cured as provided in paragraph 15 
above, interest will accrue at the rate of 2%% above the 
respective prime rates of the respective banks. 
Agreed to this 19th day of June, 1985. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. 
Richard Smith - for(^  
Park Meadows Investment 
fka Park Meadows Development 
Enoch Smith Sons Company 
Enoch Smith Co. 
:k 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK 
UTAH, N.A.-
By: 
0354M 
2221 
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ADDENDUM D 
AMENDMENT AND EXTENSION AGREEMENT 
THIS AGREEMENT is entered into, effective as of June 
28, 1985, by and among PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. (formerly 
known as Park Meadows Development Co.), a Utah Partnership; 
ENOCH RICHARD SMITH; ENOCH SMITH, JR.; MARGARET SMITH; ENOCH 
SMITH CO., a Utah Corporation; ENOCH SMITH SONS CO., a Utah 
Corporation; WEAVER'S QUALITY WELDING, a Utah Corporation 
(all hereinafter collectively referred to as ''Borrowers") 
and FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF UTAH, N.A. (hereinafter re-
ferred to as "First Interstate"). 
RECITALS 
1. First Interstate has previously extended the 
following loans to one or more of Borrowers, some of which 
are personally guaranteed by one or more of Borrowers: 
a. A loan to Park Meadows Investment Co. with a 
principal balance of $3,125,000.00 evidenced by a 
Promissory Note dated August 29, 1983, secured by 
various Trust Deeds. 
b. A loan to Park Meadows Investment Co. with a 
principal balance of $1,286,000.00 evidenced by a 
Promissory Note dated August 29, 1983, secured by 
various Trust Deeds. 
c. An unsecured loan to Park Meadows Investment 
Co. in the principal sum of $615,351.01 evidenced by a 
Promissory Note dated December 2, 1984. 
d. An unsecured loan to Park Meadows Investment 
Co. in the principal sum of $149,973.99 evidenced by a 
Promissory Note dated December 31, 1984. 
e. An unsecured loan to Park Meadows Investment 
Co. in the principal sum of $149,074.59 evidenced by a 
Promissory Note dated February 28, 1985. 
f. A loan to Enoch Smith Sons Co. with a prin-
cipal balance of $3,961,875.66 evidenced by a Prom-
issory Note dated August 29, 1983, secured by an 
assignment of 23.5 percent interest in Park Meadows 
Investment Co. (the "Partnership Note11). 
g. An unsecured loan to Enoch Smith Company with 
a principal balance of $100,000 evidenced by a Prom-
issory Note dated February 28, 1985. 
h. An unsecured loan to Enoch Smith, Jr., d/b/a 
Smith Park Acres Ranch with a principal balance 
of $250,000 evidenced by a Promissory Note dated 
February 28, 1985. 
i. An unsecured loan to Weaver Quality Welding 
with a principal balance of $150,000 evidenced by a 
Promissory Note dated February 28, 1985. 
(Referred to collectively herein as the "Notes"). 
2. In connection with negotiations surrounding the 
aforesaid loans and the obligations of Borrowers on other 
loans, some of which are in default, certain accommodations 
have been agreed to by First Interstate in exchange for 
certain additional consideration (including the granting of 
additional collateral and certain accommodations by and 
arrangements with First Security Bank of Utah, N.A., herein-
after referred to as "First Security"). 
3. Pursuant to the terms of the negotiated agreements 
among Borrowers, First Security and First Interstate, 
extension of the maturity of the above described loans and 
amendment to the payment and interest terms are to be 
accomplished. 
AGREEMENT 
NOW THEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, and 
as required under the terms of other agreements executed on 
the effective date of this Agreement, and in consideration 
of the mutual covenants, promises and agreements hereinafter 
set forth, it is agreed by and among the parties as follows: 
1. Extension of maturity date. The maturity date of 
the Notes is hereby amended and extended to be December 31, 
1986, at which time all outstanding and unpaid principal, 
along with all accrued and unpaid interest and other 
charges, fees and obligations payable in connection with the 
same shall be due and payable, in full. 
2. Revision of interest rate. The interest rates 
applicable to the notes are hereby amended to provide that 
interest, from and after June 30, 1985 shall accrue at the 
rate of one-half percent (.5Z) above the Prime Rate of First 
Interstate as announced and as changed from time to time. 
First Interstate may make loans at, above, or below its 
Prime Rate. After the date of any default or event of 
default under the Notes or this Agreement, the rate of 
interest rate per annum shall be two and one-half percent 
(2.5Z) above First Interstate's Prime Rate until such 
default shall be cured or payment in full made. 
3. Revision of payment terms. Interest payments on 
the Notes except the Partnership Note shall be payable on 
the first day of each calendar quarter commencing on October 
1, 1985, until paid in full. Mandatory prepayments of the 
principal amount outstanding under the Notes shall be made 
in accordance with the terms of that certain MPark Meadows 
Development and Related Entities: Workout Arrangement with 
FIUT and FSB", dated June 19, 1985 (the "Arrangement 
Agreement11), as sales of the properties securing the Notes 
are made and as provided in paragraph 5 below. Accrued 
interest on the Partnership Note shall be payable in full at 
maturity. 
4. Cross default provisions. Any default under the 
Notes, the Trust Deeds or Supplemental Security Agreement 
securing the Notes, or this Agreement shall constitute 
default or an event of default under the others. 
5. Principal payments. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A11 
and incorporated herein, is a Project Marketing Schedule, 
which sets forth a schedule of gross sales volume to be 
accomplished by Borrowers of property which is part of Park 
Meadows and which serves as collateral for the Notes (such 
property hereinafter referred to as the "Project11) . The 
Project marketing schedule sets out specific periods of time 
within which certain gross dollar volumes of sales of the 
Project are required. Each such period is referred to 
hereinafter as a "Marketing Period". Subject to the allow-
ances provided hereinafter, for payment of budgeted 
operating expenses, the ordinary costs of sale, and satis-
faction and payment of release prices on First Federal 
Savings and Loan priority Trust Deeds release prices and 
certain priority Trust Deeds of First Security referred to 
in the Arrangement Agreement, the following is required: 
a. All proceeds of any of the collateral security 
for the Notes and for the obligations of Borrower to 
First Security referred to in the Arrangement Agreement 
shall be paid over to First Security and disbursed by 
First Security in accordance with the provisions of 
that certain Intercreditor Agreement dated June 28, 
1985 between First Security and First Interstate (the 
"Intercreditor Agreement"). At such time as the 
obligations to First Security have been satisfied and 
paid in full, said sales proceeds shall be paid over to 
First Interstate. 
b. Borrowers covenant and agree to meet the 
schedule sales volumes in the Project for each 
Marketing Period which is set out in the Project 
Marketing Schedule, the proceeds of which will be 
applied to reduction of the First Security Loans and 
the Notes, in accordance with the Intercreditor Agree-
ment and the Arrangement Agreement; and subject to the 
cure and grace provisions hereinafter set forth, in all 
events Borrowers shall make principal reduction 
payments to First Security for the benefit of First 
Security and First Interstate equivalent to those which 
would have been provided by reason of sales in the 
volumes required under the Project Marketing Schedule 
for each Marketing Period. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if, on the last day of any 
Marketing Period the specified volume of sales required has 
not been accomplished, the default occasioned by the failure 
to meet such volume and/or provide the related principal 
reduction payment shall not result in immediate exercise of 
remedies by First Interstate hereunder so long as by the 
said ending date of the Marketing Period, 75 percent of the 
sales volume required shall have been accomplished and there 
is a reasonable likelihood, in the judgment of First 
Interstate and First Security, so long as Borrowers are 
indebted to First Security (First Security and First 
Interstate may require evidence of bona fide offers to 
purchase scheduled to close during such period), that the 
remaining 25 percent of such sales may be accomplished 
within 45 days after the end of the Marketing Period. First 
Interstate agrees to forebear with respect to the exercise 
of its default remedies for a period of 45 days in such 
eventuality. If during the subsequent 45 day period the 
remaining 25 percent of sales volume and/or payment of the 
required principal reduction shall have been accomplished 
and there is nothing which, in the reasonable judgment of 
First Interstate appears to be a continuing problem or 
defect which would likely result in a succeeding failure to 
meet the Project Marketing Schedule's sales volume required 
for the current or any subsequent Marketing Period, the 
original default shall be cured and this Agreement shall 
proceed as if no such default shall have ever occurred. 
6. Project budget. Borrowers agree to provide for 
approval of First Interstate and First Security a projected 
budget for the operation, maintenance, and marketing of the 
Project (the ,fOMM Budget11) . The OMM Budget shall be 
adjusted and amended monthly by Borrowers to reflect current 
facts and circumstances. So long as the OMM Budget shall 
have been and continues to be approved by First Interstate 
and First Security (including most recent and current 
amendments or modifications thereto), then First Interstate 
agrees that certain other proceeds of each sale of any of 
the project or of any part of parcel thereof, shall be paid 
to Borrowers for purposes of meeting OMM Budget allowed 
expenditures, the amount of such allowance (the "Budget 
Allowance11) being calculated as follows: 
The budget allowance to be paid to Borrowers shall be 
the amount obtained by multiplying the amount of 
operating, maintenance, and marketing expenses for the 
applicable Marketing Period (as set out in the current 
approved OMM Budget) by a percentage which shall be 
eaual to the Dercentaae obtained bv dividine the cross 
sale price of the subject sale by the gross sales 
volume required under the Project Sales Scheduled for 
the Marketing Period in which the sale occurs. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, if the subject sale shall be 
one which is over the required gross sales volume for the 
applicable Marketing Period, then the calculation shall be 
made as if in following Marketing Period, or, if applicable, 
subsequent Marketing Periods. Further, it is understood and 
agreed that the provisions of this paragraph allowing for 
disbursements from sales proceeds for expenditures in or 
part of the OMM Budget shall be inapplicable upon occurrence 
of an event of default under this Agreement or otherwise, 
unless a cure period as provided hereunder or in the Notes 
is then in effect. 
In all events, Borrowers shall, unless consented in writing 
by First Interstate and First Security, make only such 
expenditures as are contemplated by the approved OMM Budget 
and shall incur only such liabilities as shall be also 
contemplated by the approved OMM Budget. Further, if 
expenses actually incurred during the Marketing Period are 
less than those appearing in the OMM Budget, subsequent 
adjusting offsets against disbursements from sales proceeds 
shall occur (if Borrower shall actually have received sales 
related disbursements in the budget for such Marketing 
Period). 
7. Marketing efforts. As Borrowers understand that 
the repayment of the amounts owed to First Interstate 
hereunder and those owed to First Security are dependant 
upon effective and immediate marketing and sales of the 
Project, Borrowers agree to vigorously engage in marketing 
of the Project. If First Security and First Interstate 
shall require hereinafter in writing, Borrowers will engage 
the services of professional managers or marketers or 
consultants for purposes of expediting and completing an 
orderly and complete sale of the Project (whether by parcel 
or as a whole). In that connection, Borrowers agree further 
as follows: 
a. Borrowers shall submit to First Interstate and 
First Security copies of all offers, inquiries, earnest 
monies, and other written requests relating to the 
purchase of the Project or any portion thereof. 
b. Borrowers will immediately submit a proposed 
list of sales prices for the Project which shall be 
approved and agreed to by First Interstate and First 
Security provided that if no such approval can be 
obtained, the procedures provided in paragraph 7 of the 
Arrangement Agreement shall be immediately implemented. 
Borrowers will accept any offer to purchase which 
reasonably approximates the prices set in the price 
list. 
c. Borrowers will keep accurate records of all 
expenses and income with respect to the Project and 
shall also maintain books, records, and financial 
statements appropriate for the control of the Project 
and its operation, maintenance and marketing in accor-
dance with the OMM Budget, as approved. 
d. Borrowers will submit to First Interstate and 
First Security such records, reports, and copies of 
such documents as the said lender shall reasonably 
request from time to time, as the same relate to the 
physical status of the Project, its marketing, and all 
sales or other dispositions. 
e. Unless approved in writing by First Interstate 
and First Security, no sale of any part or parcel of 
the Project shall be for other than cash and all 
parties agree that "sale" as used herein shall only be 
a sale upon actual closing, transfer of title, and 
payment of purchase price by the buyer or on buyer's 
behalf. 
f. Borrowers shall allow representatives of First 
Interstate and First Security access to the Project at 
any time and shall also allow them opportunity at any 
reasonable hour to inspect the books and records of the 
Borrowers and shall provide for access by said lenders 
to the sales records and other marketing records which 
may be kept by third parties as they respect the 
Project. 
g. Borrowers shall make no listing arrangement, 
contract for consulting for marketing or disposition of 
the Project or any part of parcel thereof without the 
prior written approval of First Interstate and First 
Security, which approval shall not be unreasonably 
withheld. 
h. Borrowers do hereby warrant and represent to 
First Interstate that they have the title, right and 
interest necessary to grant the security interest, 
assignments, and liens in the items of collateral 
securing the Notes. 
i. Borrowers are in compliance with all laws, 
regulations, and governmental authority with respect to 
the Project and any of the property in which security 
interest or liens are granted to secure the Notes and 
will continue such compliance and observance hereafter. 
j. Borrowers shall take all reasonable actions 
necessary to preserve the assets and property in which 
First Interstate has a security interest to secure the 
Notes, including paying all necessary taxes or other 
impositions or assessments, physically maintaining the 
same, providing such care and feeding as may be re-
quired, and maintaining such insurance against hazards 
and other risks as First Interstate may require in 
connection with the same. Such insurance as is main-
tained shall be in form satisfactory to First 
Interstate and shall, as requested and available, 
contain loss payable clauses in favor of First 
Interstate as secured party or mortgagee. 
k. Except as provided for and contemplated by 
this Agreement, the Arrangement Agreement and documents 
related thereto, Borrowers agree not to further en-
cumber or pledge any of their respective assets to any 
other person or persons. 
1. Borrower shall take no actions and enter into 
no contracts, leases or other agreements without the 
prior written consent of First Interstate which will 
materially and adversely effect the ability of 
Borrowers to market the Project in compliance with the 
requirements of the Project Marketing Schedule. 
8. Other modifications — continuation of other terms. 
First Interstate hereby agrees that recourse against Enoch 
Smith, Jr. and Margaret Smith shall be and is hereby limited 
to items of real and personal property which are or have 
been provided as collateral security for the obligations 
under the Notes. It is further agreed that Enoch Smith Sons 
Co. is relieved from liability under the Partnership Note 
and First Interstate1s sole recourse under said partnership 
note shall be to the collateral pledged as security there-
for. 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the aforesaid release and 
nonrecourse covenant is based upon representations and 
warranties of Enoch Smith, Jr. and Margaret Smith relative 
to their overall assets and their rights in assets given as 
collateral security for the Notes. Accordingly, in the 
event that there shall have been any material and inten-
tional misrepresentation (including the failure to disclose 
material facts) the aforesaid nonrecourse covenant shall be 
void and of no force or effect. Further, the releases made 
hereunder shall in no way result in (unless otherwise 
provided in writing signed by First Interstate) a release or 
waiver of claim for any other persons, entities, or parties 
obligated on the loans mentioned hereinabove. 
9. Subordination. Enoch Smith, Jr. and Enoch Richard 
Smith further agree and hereby do subordinate their rights 
as partners of Park Meadows Investment Co. to receive 
proceeds from Park Meadows Mountain, a Utah general 
partnership, to First Interstatefs rights to payments under 
the Notes, and agree that any payments or proceeds so 
received will be promptly paid over to First Interstate 
until such time as the Notes are paid in full. 
10. Other terms. In all other respects, the terms and 
conditions of the Notes shall continue to be in full force 
and effect, including, but not limited to, collateral 
pledged and guarantees. 
11. Subordination. Bank hereby acknowledges and 
agrees that Borrowers are contemporaneously herewith 
executing in favor of Bank trust deeds on real property 
known as Park Meadows, X-S Storage, St. George Condos, Smith 
Park Acres Ranch and the Kentucky Ranch (by mortgage 
instrument) and that said trust deeds and mortgage shall be 
subordinate and inferior to a similar pledge to First 
Security, all as contemplated by the Arrangement Agreement. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto do set their 
hands and cause the execution of this Agreement, effective 
on the "effective date11 first set forth hereinabove. 
PARK MEADOWS INVESTMENT CO. 
(a.k.a. Park Meadows 
Development Co.) 
General Partner 
Date: *7~rf 1985 
ENOCH SMITH SONS CO. 
ItS l/i*+< /**w« 5 
Date: V ^ T , 1985 
ENOCH S&ITH CO. /? 
Its l4c~t P~** 5 
Date: *V_ / ^ , 1985 
WEAVER QUALITY WELDING 
D a t e : y ~ i°f r 
'~4@£&5 
TWS 
ENOCH SMITH, JR., Individually 
Date: -?w f , 1985 
^ f 1985 
FIRST INTERSTATE BANK OF 
UTAH, N.A. 
By: 
I t s : Si/P 
Date: 7 - a.3 , 1985 
LI :aa 
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The attached Marketing Schedule/Budget shall 
be reviewed and analyzed by Borrowers, First Security 
and First Interstate. The parties shall cooperate 
in establishing the quarterly goals of marketing and 
quarterly budget requirements, based upon the cmnual 
totals in the attached schedule. The parties shall 
also consider the effect of, and an appropriate 
adjustment regarding the period from the date of this 
Schedule, July 23, 1985, to the end of the calendar 
quarter, September 30, 1985. 
Zotil ? « r 
5 - -• , 
Assumptions.- 1. Current Inventory ($3,307,108? discounted 30% except 
Gleaneacles. Gleneacles is discounted 44*. Total of 
$5,563,976 / 3years = $ 1,856,325. 
2. Price per unit to esclate $ 5,000 per year 
3. Calendar year to begin when settlement agreement 
is reached. 
Park Yeacows (Yeacows Only 973 units) 
Potential Pro Porna Cash Plow 3 years 
1335 to 1988 
1985-86 1986-87 1987—88 
Income 
Parcel Units Sold (15 326 326 327 
Price/Parcel Ur.its(2) 25000 30000 35000 
Current Inventory 1856325 1856325 1356325 
Total Income 100C6325 11636325 13301325 
Operating Expenses 
Gen & Admin (4) 315000 33705c 360644 
. C - .\ .T.CCU v^ <w '.*»'/ - ^  w \^  s.- •«. -, w \ u ^•• v. N-/ O \s \s \s \J 
Ac.vert-s«nc, (6} Zuu./.c CJ*I.:<: 465v(r 
Sales Corm. (7) 6CC3T5 633173 79SC7S 
Miscei:ar.eous(S) 200126 232726 266C26 
Property Taxes(3) 200C0C 133333 66667 
Total Expenses 1635631 1734021 1337441 
Oper. Cash Flow 8370634 9902304 11463884 
Capital Improvements 
Struc. Dev. (10 5 1733600 1392000 
C » U D jiouse \ + * i 
7er.r.is Club (l?;. 
™*-s*^" • *fl"5tf*A * ^  ^  « ^  « « 
Cash Flow 3efore 
Ir.terest & Debt 6637C94 3510304 11463SS4 
Reductior. (13) 
Cther 3ebt 666666 666666 666666 
Ir.terest Payr.er.t f 14) 173C0CC 1360357 7126S9 
Principal Seducticr. 4130423 6432631 7126391 
Loar. "3alar.ee: $17,800,000 136^357? 7126331 
? 10% Interest 
Net Profit 3e?ore 295763S 
Taxes fi 3eor. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Appellant 
First Interstate Bank of Utah this 22nd day of November, 1989, 
to the following: 
Glenn C. Hanni, Esq. 
Mark J. Taylor, Esq. 
Victoria K. Kidman, Esq. 
Strong & Hanni 
Sixth Floor Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Appellees Beckers and Dougans 
Hardin A. Whitney, Esq. 
Jeffrey Robinson, Esq. 
Moyle & Draper 
600 Deseret Plaza 
No. 15 East First South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-115 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee Park Meadows 
^IM. ^JiJAid/Uk^ 
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